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“6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the 
following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of 
natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with 
philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say 
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to 
give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would 
not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling 
that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only 
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“What is your aim in philosophy? -- To show the fly the way out 
of the fly-bottle” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI 309). 
Philosophy of medicine: a personal stance 
Until the late 70s, philosophy of science was still conceived as a theory of scientific 
knowledge, investigating the problem of its foundations, the problem of its methods, 
and the problem of the application of the resulting technologies, considering the aims 
of science also from an ethical perspective. In other words, there was a view of science 
as a unitary enterprise, ultimately reducible to physics. While, in more recent years, 
from the 80s onwards, philosophers of science have begun to recognize the different 
features of each scientific discipline: chemistry, biology, neurosciences, medicine, 
social sciences, and so on and so forth. 
Within the philosophy of special sciences, we can identify two main approaches. 
The first one aims to discuss topical issues of philosophy of science – such as 
explanation, causation, confirmation, demarcation, etc. – within the relevant science, in 
order to make some philosophical progress, say, for instance, revising (again) the 
notion of scientific explanation or providing a new (yet another) normative theory of 
causation. Whereas, the second approach aims precisely at the opposite, directly 
addressing scientific issues, discussing them applying philosophical tools and 
reasoning in order to actively contribute to the scientific progress. 
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Between the two approaches, there is, first and foremost, a fundamental 
difference in the understanding of what exactly constitutes a philosophical problem. 
For the former, philosophical problems are essentially inherited from the past. 
Traditionally, there are topics which fall within the sole competence of philosophy: 
causation, for instance, has been discussed since the time of Aristotle. On the contrary, 
for the latter approach, the ones of tradition are not the only issues which deserve 
philosophical investigation, but there is much more worthy of philosophical analysis 
embedded in science. Broadly speaking, philosophical problems are those which 
people disagree about and for which empirical evidence cannot provide any certain 
answer. Then, there is little dispute that this sort of problems is common in every 
scientific discipline. Ethical issues are precisely that sort of problems, and they are the 
easiest to recognize, especially in biomedical sciences, because everyone is somehow 
familiar with ethics. By contrast, methodological and conceptual problems are usually 
a matter only for specialists. Therefore, it is hard to recognize them for everyone who 
has never been dealing with science.  
By definition, empirical evidence cannot be brought to resolve methodological 
and conceptual problems. For example, which experimental design is better to 
implement in order to confirm a particular hypothesis is not something taken for 
granted nor is possible to get such a decision on the basis of an experiment.  It is 
precisely in such areas that a philosophical approach could be helpful both for science 
and scientists. In such a way, there is hope of providing evidence that philosophy is not 
just a lot of hot air. As a matter of fact, philosophers are trained in tackling such 
methodological and conceptual questions, and they have skills which better enable 
them to identify those problems. We firmly believe that a philosopher who has been 
also trained in a scientific discipline can even settle the issues of that discipline 
definitively. With the appropriate scientific training, his approach can help to clarify 
3 
 
the problems, enlighten the potential solutions, eliminate some unreasonable options, 
provide convincing arguments, and avoid inconsistencies. From this point of view, 
philosophy of science is a growing and evolving discipline with an increasing impact 
on society. 
Among the philosophies of special sciences, philosophy of medicine is quite an 
emerging field. Albeit the relationship between philosophy and medicine dates back to 
ancient time, it has emerged as an academic discipline only recently. One of the 
fundamental and most long-standing debates in the philosophy of medicine relates to 
the basic concepts of health and disease (see Boorse 1975). Exploring this distinction 
remains epistemologically and morally important as these definitions influence when 
and where people seek medical treatment, and whether society regards them as “ill”, 
including whether they are permitted or urged to receive medical treatments. The 
dividing line between disease and health is notoriously vague, and there is a great deal 
of disagreement in the literature in philosophy of medicine.  
In the 80s the privileged epistemological status of medicine has been 
questioned from various perspectives: social anthropologists and historians have 
explored its cultural contingency; medical sociologists described medicine “as an 
institution of social control and the locus of professional power struggles for cognitive 
authority and control” (Richards 1988); influential and eminent figures within and 
outside medicine - such as Cochrane (1972) and Illich (1981) - have criticized its 
autonomy and its efficacy. As well, philosophers considering medicine in the context of 
science emphasized its distinctiveness (or inferiority) compared to physical sciences. 
The Evidence-Based Medicine movement that arose in the 90s can be seen 
partly as an effort to make medicine more scientific, grounding the “practice” of 
medicine in theoretical more methodologically robust disciplines, such as clinical 
epidemiology. In general, the impetus for EBM can be attributed to an increasing 
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awareness of the weaknesses of standard clinical practices and their impact on both 
the quality and costs of healthcare in the United States. The EBM movement mostly 
focused on how we should assess the safety and efficacy of medical therapies, in a way 
that can lead clinical decisions. According to an overused definition/quotation: 
“Evidence-based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and 
judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the 
care of individual patients” (Sackett et al. 1996). 
The main concern of EBM advocates was that too often physicians relied merely 
on their judgment and experience to make a clinical decision, which over the years have 
been proved to be misleading. To provide an alternative and a definition of what counts 
as “best evidence”, proponents of EBM have developed a “hierarchy of evidence” that 
categorize different research methods with respect to their supposed quality. At the 
top of the hierarchy of evidence are Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs). Thus, 
evidence produced by RCTs has been called the “gold standard” of evidence in EBM. 
“However, to refer to RCTs as the “gold standard” of evidence suggests that they are 
more. Specifically, one may be led to assume that RCTs are necessary for reliable causal 
inference or that RCTs are guaranteed to deliver reliable results” (Reiss and Ankeny 
2016). That is why, in the last decade, many philosophers of medicine have scrutinized 
RCTs in all their facets.  
Briefly, RCTs are tightly controlled experiments for the evaluation of 
interventions1. The major difference between them and other experimental designs is 
the random allocation of the participants in the two group of the trial. Randomization 
                                                        
1 Note that a RCT is not merely a clinical trial, but they can also be employed in many other contexts: for 
instance, to evaluate economic or socio-educational interventions. Since we are here in a medical 
context, I limit myself to mentioning clinical RCTs. 
5 
 
is a key feature because it protects against selection bias2,  it provides the basis for 
statistical inference (Armitage 1982, 2003), and it permits masking. Nancy Cartwright 
and John Worrall more than anyone else challenged the first two assumptions. In 
particular, they hold that randomization is neither essential for statistical tests nor it 
can control for all confounders (Cartwright 2010, 2011, 2012; Cartwright and Hardie 
2015; Worrall 2007, 2010a, 2010b). Moreover, RCTs are often criticized for their low 
external validity. The distinction between internal versus external validity of clinical 
trials refers to how well a study answers certain questions. In general, a clinical trial 
has high internal validity “if the results can be considered accurate for the sample 
included in the study” (La Caze 2016). Whereas, external validity “is the degree to 
which the results of an observation hold true in other setting” (Fletcher, Fletcher, and 
Wagner 1996). While the internal validity depends on the capacity of an experimental 
design to control for biases and confounders, the external validity requires something 
more, such as an understanding of how the intervention under testing works (causal 
knowledge) and of the context in which the intervention is to be employed. Therefore, 
as suggested by many scholars (e.g. Howick, Glasziou, and Aronson 2013; Clarke et al. 
2013; Illari 2016), we must rely on other sources of evidence, for instance mechanistic 
knowledge or experts’ judgment, in order to improve the external validity of a 
randomized trial. 
Because of these epistemic limitations, RCTs appear to be increasingly ill-
adapted to influence medical decision-making, therefore philosophers of science have 
recently argued for an epistemic pluralism. Nobody suggests that researchers should 
give up RCTs. Instead, they urge the supplementation of RCTs with other forms of 
evidence: we should avoid reduction to a single method. There are indeed different 
                                                        
2 However, it is curious, as Mebius suggests, that “there has been no clear evidence to date to support 
the claim […] that randomization reduces selection bias” (Mebius 2014). 
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forms of medical knowledge that must be integrated with RCTs to make a causal 
inference more robust. For instance, many philosophers of sciences (e.g. Clarke et al. 
2013; Campaner 2011; Illari 2011; Illari 2016; Russo and Williamson 2007) have 
emphasized the importance of mechanisms, which are held to be essential for causal 
inference.  As of today, three research projects are leading the way in the field: EBM+ 
(Clarke et al. 2013), Cause Health, and Philpharm (Landes, Osimani, and Poellinger 
2017). All the projects aim at defending a pluralistic approach to causal inference in 
medicine.  
The debate surrounding the foundations of EBM makes the nature of 
philosophical disputes in medicine even more evident:  they are not only theoretically 
interesting per se but also because they might have an impact on medical practice. 
Insofar as we are concerned more with the practical consequences of this theoretical 
debate, regulatory issues come along (see Reiss 2010). 
Clinical trials and drug regulation: a philosophical inquiry 
This thesis examines some recent controversies surrounding the evaluation of medical 
treatments and the organization of drug regulation. A significant issue is whether or 
not the current approach to the regulation of new medicines should be modified to 
manage issues generated by new biomedical products. One might reasonably question 
whether regulatory systems with their roots in the early part of the twentieth century 
are actually capable of dealing with the issues and problems posed by the molecular 
revolution.  
As mentioned above, many philosophers of science have already scrutinized the 
epistemological features of RCTs, mostly undermining their status as the “gold 
standard” method for assessing causality (e.g. Cartwright 2010; Russo and Williamson 
2007; Worrall 2007). While, critics of pharmaceutical system (Gøtzsche 2013; Goldacre 
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2014; Ioannidis 2016) believe that epistemological limitations of clinical trials are a 
backdoor for promoting the interests of pharmaceutical companies. This thesis aims at 
broadening the philosophical analysis of clinical trials beyond epistemology to re-
appraise their epistemic import within the socio-political context in which they are 
embedded. Hopefully, this philosophical analysis would allow a better understanding 
of current debates on regulation of new medical products, facilitating the integration 
of microsocial level and epistemological level of analysis of regulatory standards of 
evidence. 
These are exciting times for translational medicine as the convergence between 
fundamental and clinical research comes of age. As Boniolo and Nathan put it (Boniolo 
and Nathan 2016), “Molecular medicine is likely to become one of the next exciting 
frontiers of philosophical research”, and just recently philosophers have started to 
investigate the philosophical implications of the molecular revolution in biology and 
medicine. Over the last decades, many scientific breakthroughs have enabled the 
development of increasingly complex medical treatments. Also, advances in biomedical 
sciences and technology have boosted the production of new medicines. Clearly, there 
has been an impressive acceleration after the first releases of the Human Genome 
Project, which has offered an actionable entry into virtually all diseases with a genetic 
basis. As an example, we have really achieved some major advancements in gene and 
stem cell therapy3. With the former, we can treat rare and less rare diseases, such as 
Wiskott-Aldrich syndrome (Aiuti et al. 2013) and hemophilia B (Nathwani et al. 2014), 
while stem cell therapy is now a commercial reality for corneal regeneration (Rama et 
al. 2010). Nonetheless, many are arguing that we did reach nothing more than that: 
biomedical research has not actually delivered as much as expected (e.g. Joyner, 
                                                        
3  Gene therapy can be defined as the use of genetic material (usually DNA) to manipulate a patient's cells 
for the treatment of a disease. Cell therapy can be defined as the infusion or transplantation of whole 
cells into a patient. 
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Paneth, and Ioannidis 2016). In some areas, such as oncology, many medical needs are 
still unmet, and we are not seeing the breakthrough therapies that we expect given the 
enormous cognitive and financial resources put into basic research. On the one hand, 
our comprehension of the biological basis of disease is exponentially increasing; on the 
other hand, very few medicines reach the bed of the patients, and when it happens they 
often fail to deliver any real benefit on overall survival or quality of life (see Davis et al. 
2017). This gap between basic and clinical research is widely known and it is usually 
described as the “valley of death” (Butler 2008). As the pharmaceutical industry 
productivity crisis worsens, there are calls for regulatory changes to support 
innovation. 
Especially in cancer research, things are changing at a hectic pace. We cannot 
enumerate here the myriads of cancer therapies that have been developed in the last 
decade, nonetheless we are bound to mention the pivotal paper by Hanahan and 
Weinberg “The Hallmarks of Cancer” (Hanahan and Weinberg 2011). According to 
Hanahan and Weinberg, targeted therapies can be categorized according to their 
respective effects on hallmark capabilities of cancer. What is worth to highlight in the 
present context is that targeted therapies are highly selective, meaning that they act on 
specific molecular targets. This sort of treatments was simply unthinkable one century 
ago when the regulatory system emerged. This latter was designed indeed to provide 
massive consumer protection at a point when our understanding of the biology of 
cancer was still relatively poor and statistical tests gave the only solid evidence about 
treatment effects. Whereas, the majority of scientific breakthroughs in biomedicine 
(from cracking the genetic code to the discovery of restriction enzymes) took place 
after the regulatory reforms and would not bear fruit until the 70s and 80s. As of today, 
the exponential growth of treatments both in number and complexity is posing many 
challenges to regulators.  
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The basic idea underlying medical regulation entails that governments have an 
obligation and responsibility to protect the public from unreasonable harms. It is 
precisely for this reason that national regulatory agencies have been established in 
Western democracies. Of course, at the same time, a rational regulation must not stifle 
medical innovation, biomedical research, and technological development. Even under 
ideal circumstances, this balance is hard to reach. With this regard, the current gold 
standard to assess drug safety and efficacy (RCTs) is showing its age. On the one hand, 
reformists of the regulatory system claim that the current cumbersome standard is 
preventing many potentially lifesaving treatments from reaching patients’ bed. On the 
other hand, critics are complaining about the many shortcomings of RCTs, which would 
provide low-quality scientific evidence, hardly answering any relevant clinical 
question, thus not offering any real protection to patients. Nonetheless, they both agree 
that the current critical trial system is broken4, and a more rational regulatory system 
is desirable. 
Even a superficial look at regulatory documents is sufficient to claim that in its 
core parts drug regulation has not evolved much over the years, especially in setting 
up scientific standards to assess safety and efficacy of innovative treatments. Although 
targeted therapy agents are increasingly available for clinical applications, many of 
these promising drugs have produced disappointing results when tested in clinical 
trials, indicating that there are many challenges that must be addressed to advance this 
field (Schilsky et al. 2010; Wistuba et al. 2011). Most standard trial designs are not 
optimal for testing targeted drug. For instance, in oncology one major issue is patient 
recruitment. Many therapies are targeting narrow populations of patients harboring a 
                                                        
4 See for instance the speech that Janet Woodcock, director of FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research, delivered at a recent workshop on real world evidence (RWE) at the National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-
Focus/News/2017/09/20/28500/FDAs-Woodcock-The-Clinical-Trials-System-is-Broken/ Accessed 
October 12, 2017). 
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specific genetic mutation, which are numbered in hundreds whereas standard trial 
designs require thousands of participants. Secondly, many of these drugs are cytostatic 
rather than cytotoxic, and thus they would not meet the usual end points when tested 
in a typical registration trial. While for standard chemotherapy the conventional 
method of measuring effectiveness is through tumor shrinkage, for target therapies 
time to progression or progression-free survival (PFS) better capture the beneficial 
effects. However, these outcomes are not considered as “objective” endpoints, and are 
not sufficient for regular market approval. 
The practical challenges to meet the old standard of evidence on the one hand, 
and the pressures from companies and patients’ associations on the other hand, 
pushed the regulators to grant more and more exceptions. Indeed, as a reaction to these 
pressure, the FDA has developed 4 different alternative regulatory pathways: fast 
track, breakthrough therapy, accelerated approval, priority review. On their own, 
clinical research and pharmaceutical companies have started to investigate alternative 
trial designs (e.g. adaptive trials). However, this continuous derogation from well-
conducted RCTs has raised many concerns about the “quality” of regulatory decisions. 
These concerns have been motivated also by some notorious failures, as, for instance, 
in the case of Avastin®. Very briefly, Avastin® (bevacizumab), is an inhibitor of 
angiogenesis, targeting VEGF growth factor. The rationale of the drug is simple, since 
tumors need to develop blood vessels to grow and survive, the inhibition of 
angiogenesis could be a very effective therapeutic line. In 2008, Avastin has been tested 
in three different clinical trials for three different types of tumors, colorectal, lung and 
breast cancer, with positive results. However, subsequent attempts to replicate those 
findings in larger trials failed (see D’Agostino 2011; Sekeres 2011). 
In general, the difficult question regulators are facing is when the study design 
and gathered data are good enough to be relied upon. For instance, while we should be 
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justifiably cautious about claiming that effects observed in small trials are causal 
(Pereira, Horwitz, and Ioannidis 2012), sometimes an effect is just too strong to be 
dismissed because there may be biases, but determining exactly when is a matter of 
contentious. Moreover, many breakthrough therapies are tested only with very 
rudimental experimental designs. The recent development and approval of chimeric 
antigen receptor T-cell therapy (Tisagenlecleucel/Kymriah®) for the treatment of 
refractory B-cell acute lymphoblastic leukemia (ALL) is a nice illustration thereof. CAR-
T cell treatment starts from a person's own cells, isolates them from the body, 
engineers them to express a tumor-specific chimeric receptor (CAR), and puts them 
back in the body where they can attack cancer cells. The FDA approval of Kymriah® is 
based on the results of an open-label, multicenter, single-arm Phase II small trial 
(N=63). The FDA’s decision raised many concerns, also because of the choice of the 
drug manufacturer (Novartis) to charge it 425,000 dollars. According to many scholars, 
evidence from different sources can be considered reliable in some circumstances, but 
there is not yet a clear consensus on that. In the case of Kymriah® the suspicion that 
emotional stories, such as that of Emily Whitehead (see (Rosenbaum 2017), have been 
a major drive of the approval decision, is legitimate. Thus, in such a case a call for more 
robust evidence may be reasonable, even though RCTs are hardly conceivable: patients 
recruitment and masking being the major issues, in addition to the enormous costs 
involved. 
In conclusion, identifying issues with current evidential comparisons and 
evaluations of medical interventions, and indicating how they can be improved is 
philosophically interesting and it also has the potential to improve the scientific basis 
upon which regulatory systems are based. A rational approach to drug regulation 
should aim not only at making the evaluation of new products more efficient, but also 
at making these products available to patients more quickly and thereby to enhance 
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public health. Nonetheless, it remains to be elucidated whether new regulatory 
standards of evidence, being they either methodologically naive or statistically 
sophisticated, are reliable enough to guide sound regulatory decisions, and this inquiry 
is not reducible only to epistemic consideration. There is indeed one major 
philosophical claim in the subtext of this dissertation, who serves also as a general 
thread: epistemic considerations alone are not sufficient to capture the current 
controversies over regulatory standards of evidence. The question on how we should 
regulate medical treatments does not really resolve into a mere debate on causality. 
In the following chapters, we will extensively explore some of the topics 
mentioned in this introduction. Shifting scientific landscape poses new challenges and 
requires the freedom and flexibility to continuously adapt and evolve. This also applies 
to philosophers who are tracking those landscapes, that is why we decided to branch 
away from the proto-book dissertation model, and organized this thesis as a collection 
of articles. Each chapter has been indeed conceived as a self-standing paper. To 
facilitate reading and examination, references are provided at the end of each chapter. 
The present short overview of regulatory issues is clearly not comprehensive but 
rather an attempt to give an idea about the complexity of this important area of work 
that has many direct links with philosophy of science. 
Summary of chapters 
Why do we need Randomized Controlled Trials? 
In this chapter, we dig into the history of the RCTs in order to bring out and make clear 
the reasons why they became the gold standard for drug testing and regulation. In 
doing so, we focus on the evolution of drug regulation in the United States arguing that 
scandals played a crucial role in the development of drug regulations, forcing 
regulators to acknowledge the weak points of previous standards and to consider more 
13 
 
robust alternatives, ranging from laboratory test to clinical trials. Changes and reforms 
were implemented in the regulatory system as a response to major pharmaceutical 
scandals, and not in response to the real epistemic needs put in place by developments 
in drugs research.  
The philosophical debate has focused on the methodological virtues and vices 
of RCTs, praising or blaming them to the extent that they could succeed in assessing 
causality. This “oversimplification of trials epistemology” has already been pointed out, 
but still, the role of scandals in fostering methodological progress in drug regulation is 
quite neglected. If we are right in claiming that regulators adopted RCTs in order to 
prevent pharmaceutical scandals, then we should evaluate the epistemic import of trial 
designs also to the extent to which they can prevent scandals. 
More than one way to measure: a casuistic approach to cancer clinical trials 
Nowadays RCTs are usually cumbersome experiments, expensive and costly. Clinical 
researchers and regulators have been almost blind to alternatives, focusing instead on 
large trials (large populations for statistical power), hypothesis testing, and control for 
type 1 error. While this is perfectly fine for many treatments, it is not satisfactory for 
new oncological ones. In the last years, science and technology made great progress 
towards a better understanding of fundamental biological mechanisms of the diseases. 
As of today, we know that each tumor has a different genomic basis despite its site of 
occurrence and is controlled by the local microenvironment. This genomic 
heterogeneity and complexity make the treatment of the disease nearly impossible 
with most of the current chemotherapies. In this chapter, we show that the gold 
standard for testing and approving drugs is not suitable to test new cancer treatments 
anymore and that it might be a bottleneck for progress in managing cancer, as argued 
by reformists of regulatory system. Then we claim that: (1) in some cases we have an 
14 
 
epistemological justification to abandon the obsession with the null-hypothesis testing, 
and consequently (2) there is no way by which FDA could still retain the old “one size 
fits all” approach. There is no doubt that the traditional two-armed randomized 
controlled trial revolutionized medicine, moving medical research from art to science, 
but now RCTs are likely the weakest link in the chain of scientific knowledge. 
Rules versus standards: a legal-philosophical framework for drug regulation 
Over the last decade, philosophers of science have extensively criticized the epistemic 
superiority of RCTs for testing safety and efficacy of new drugs, defending instead 
various forms of evidential pluralism. We argue that scientific methods in regulatory 
decision making cannot be assessed in epistemic terms only: there are various costs 
involved. Drawing on the legal distinction between rules and standards, we show that 
drug regulation based on evidential pluralism has much higher costs than our current 
RCT-based system. We analyze these costs and advocate for evaluating any scheme for 
drug regulatory tests in terms of concrete empirical benchmarks, like the error rates of 
regulatory decisions. 
Drug regulation and evidentiary pluralism 
In this chapter, we want to argue that the multiplicity of testing standards is more 
defensible than critics think. As a matter of fact, since 1962 we already have multiple 
testing standards for testing the safety and the efficacy of medical treatments, and the 
system has worked reasonably well so far. As we argue, medical treatments (not just 
drugs) have different testing standards according to the potential public health risks 
they pose.  With regard to this, we present a concept of risk that, in our view, captures 
our current regulatory consensus. Risks depend on two factors: the hazards involved 
in a treatment and the number of people potentially exposed to it. From a political 
standpoint, this concept of risk is all we need to justify the existence of multiple testing 
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standards. Consequently, different testing standards are defensible for certain class of 
drugs (e.g. targeted therapies). Finally, we address a potential crucial objection to our 
argument: that any a priori assessment of risks always comes with an unacceptable 
degree of uncertainty, therefore we should always demand for stricter testing 
standards. 
Statistical evidence and the reliability of medical research 
In this chapter, we focus on the reliability of RCTs conducted to test the safety and 
efficacy of medical treatments.  RCTs are scientific experiments and, as such, we expect 
them to be replicable. However, for more than a decade now we have been discussing 
a replicability crisis across different experimental disciplines including medicine: the 
outcomes of trials published in very prestigious journals often disappear when the 
experiment is repeated. First, we see how replicability and statistical significance are 
connected: we can only make sense of the p-value of a trial outcome within a series of 
replications of the test. But, in order to conduct these replications properly, we need to 
agree on the proper design of the experiment we are going to repeat. Then, we argue 
that trialists need to agree on the debiasing procedures and the statistical quality 
controls that feature in the trial protocol if they want the outcome to be replicable. 
Furthermore, we make two complementary points. On the one hand, replicability per 
se is not everything: we need trial outcomes that are not only statistically significant 
but also clinically relevant. On the other hand, trials are not everything: the experts 
analyzing the evidence can improve the reliability of statistical evidence, although they 





The following chapters, accordingly amended, have been published/submitted, 
or are in preparation for submission, as follows: 
Andreoletti M. – Why do we need Randomized Controlled Trials? (in 
preparation) 
Andreoletti M. – More than one way to measure? A casuistic approach to cancer 
clinical trials (Submitted to Perspective in Biology and Medicine) 
Andreoletti M. & Teira D. – Rules versus Standards: a legal-philosophical 
framework for drug regulation (Submitted to Science, Technology, and Human Values) 
Andreoletti M. – Drug regulation and evidentiary pluralism (in preparation) 
Andreoletti M. & Teira D. – Statistical evidence and the reliability of biomedical 
research (in book: eds. Solomon M., Simon JR., Kincaid H., The Routledge Companion to 
Philosophy of Medicine, Routledge, 2016) 
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1. WHY DO WE NEED RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED 
TRIALS? 
“What has history to do with me? Mine is the first and only 
world” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, NB p. 82). 
1.1 Introduction  
As all the medical-scientific community knows, Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) are 
the main experimental study design to evaluate the efficacy of a specific treatment in a 
given population. Conventionally, the term “treatment” refers to many kinds of 
interventions: diagnostic, screening, health education, etc. Although RCTs are 
systematically and extensively adopted in the drug research and testing, as they are the 
last phase of a mandatory threefold process, which is strictly regulated by 
transnational laws. Of course, RCTs did not come out of the blue, nor did the rules that 
had made them compulsory. In this chapter, we dig into the history of the randomized 
controlled trials in order to bring out and make clear the reasons why they became the 
gold standard for drug testing and regulation. In doing so, we focus on the evolution of 
drug regulation in the United States (Gaudillière & Hess 2012; Marks 1997; Temin 
1980, 1985). In particular, we argue that pharmaceutical scandals played a crucial role 
in the development of drug regulations, forcing regulators to acknowledge the weak 
points of previous standards and to consider more robust alternatives, ranging from 
laboratory tests to RCTs. The historical investigation of the evolution of methodological 
concepts would be sufficient to warrant our claim (Schickore 2011). When, why and in 
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what context did regulators implement RCTs as the gold standard for drugs testing? As 
we argue, changes and reforms were implemented in response to major 
pharmaceutical scandals, and not in response to the real epistemic needs put in place 
by developments in drugs research. On the contrary, these epistemic needs remained 
largely unsatisfied.  
Our claim is in contrast with the mainstream epistemology of clinical trials, 
which consider them as the result of a methodological development and scientific 
progress of medicine. Many philosophers of science and physicians have argued indeed 
that RCTs have been designed to assess a genuine casual relation between the drug and 
its effects. Then, the debate has focused on the methodological virtues and vices of 
RCTs, praising or blaming them to the extent that they could succeed in assessing 
causality (Cartwright 2010, 2011; Clarke et al. 2013; Howick 2011; Worrall 2010b, 
2010a). This “oversimplification of trials epistemology” has already been pointed out 
(Hey 2015), but still the role of scandals in fostering innovations in drug regulation is 
quite neglected among philosophers of science. If we are right in claiming that 
regulators adopted RCTs in order to avoid pharmaceutical scandals, then one should 
evaluate the epistemic import of trial designs also to the extent to which they could 
prevent scandals. Taking into account historical and socio-political context is 
particularly relevant for the recent debate on the adoption on new regulatory 
standards (Avorn and Kesselheim 2015). As the historian of medicine, Marcia Meldrum 
put it: “the RCT is a dynamic methodology, and its present and future are informed by 
its history” (Meldrum 2000). 
Historically, the link between scandals and policies in Western democracies is 
nothing new: many sociologists and political scientists have discussed it for decades 
(Butler, Drakeford, and Butler 2005; Thompson 2013). In general, a scandal is defined 
as an event, often regarded as morally wrong, which causes public outrage. While is 
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clear that scandals play a crucial role in the general political scenario, is quite 
uncharted whether these events could have an impact in other fields1, such as clinical 
research. In the following paragraphs we are going to show that they had a crucial role 
in triggering reforms in drug regulation, and hence in shaping the methodology of 
contemporary clinical research. RCTs served at best the goals of regulators. 
1.2 The great American fraud 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, laboratory science had a great boost 
thanks to the development of many basic research fields such as chemistry, physiology, 
and microbiology. These scientific advancements ended up in what historian of 
medicine Charles Rosenberg (Rosenberg 1997) has called a “therapeutic revolution”, 
that is, the discovery of a noticeable number of effective therapeutic agents. Physicians 
and patients were deeply affected by this “revolution”, as they came across a 
continuously increasing number of new drugs. 
Private companies manufactured most of the drugs that were placed on the 
market in those years: their share in the U.S. drug market was the 72% and their 
business was continuously growing. At that time, the chemical composition of almost 
all the compounds was kept strictly secret to protect intellectual property and patent. 
However, physicians realized soon that many drugs did not contain any active 
ingredient, but pharmaceutical companies promoted the inactive drugs in the same 
way as the ones with real and active compounds. This is why, for instance, Samuel 
Hopkins Adams, an American investigative journalist (a muckraker), in 1905 coined the 
expression “The Great American Fraud” referring to the drug trade situation. In 
discussing therapeutic reforms, the market plays a contingent yet significant role, as 
                                                        
1 Carpenter (Carpenter 2010) and Porter (Porter 1996) are partial remarkable exceptions. While 
Hutchinson (Hutchison 2016) has recently made a similar point, but focusing on nursing practice. 
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much as scientific progress does. Indeed, at a certain point, the medical scientific 
community had to face “a novel intellectual and political problem” (Marks 1997) how 
to foster even further the increasing scientific progress in the laboratories while 
protecting the patients and the market from fake and potentially unsafe drugs.  In other 
words, there was the need to tell apart effective and ineffective drugs without 
discrediting the entire scientific enterprise. 
The American Medical Association (AMA) made the first effort towards a more 
rational approach to pharmaceutical therapeutics. However, while the Journal of the 
association was reviewing and publishing the best results of medical research, it also 
printed advertisements for some very low-quality drugs. In order to solve this 
apparent contradiction, on the spring of 1905 the AMA established the Council on 
Pharmacy and Chemistry, which had the task of investigating the medicines advertised 
in the pages of the Journal. Very soon, the Council thought that its scope had to be 
extended to all new medicines available to physicians and not only to those advertised 
in the JAMA. The work of the Council was to review the scientific evidence supporting 
a drug and deliberate on its quality. In practice, the scientific evidence was often scarce 
and then the deliberation of the council reflected “a curious mixture of judgments […] 
and opinions” (Marks 1997). When the council’s assessment was a matter of laboratory 
tests, in order to reveal whether the drug contained an active known ingredient, the 
decision was quite easy. However, pharmaceutical companies developed also drugs 
containing ingredients that could be tested in a laboratory, but whose beneficial 
properties were completely unknown. In these murky cases, the deliberation was more 
difficult or even impossible. In these latter cases, extra-scientific considerations, such 
as the track record of the companies, played a major role in the deliberation process. 
As just mentioned, clinical evidence was often scarce or even missing; the Council 
relied on the expertise of academic clinicals but often bumped into opinions too much 
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different. Hence, they warned that their approval for the biological purity of the 
compounds did not imply clinical efficacy. In many cases, laboratory tests could not 
address the question of efficacy. Take for instance glandular extracts (e.g. red bone 
marrow, ovarian, parotid gland extracts) that were common on the market in the early 
1900s. Usually, labels reported correctly the chemical composition, and this could be 
easily tested in the laboratories. However, it was unclear what all those extracts 
actually did: laboratory tests were not sufficient for that question. 
Nonetheless, the U.S. Government in 1906 passed a first key-legislation to 
control drug market: the Pure Food and Drug Act. The new law gave to the Bureau of 
Chemistry (the predecessor to the FDA) in the Department of Agriculture the legal 
power to seize adulterated or misbranded products (Junod 2008). But it assumed the 
same standards of the Council: laboratory tests to check whether a drug contained the 
ingredients labeled or advertised by the manufacturer. However, the law did not allow 
anyone to screen drugs and control for potential frauds before their placing on the 
market: it was remedial but not preventive. Moreover, the meaning and the exact 
enforcement of the 1906 Act were questionable. In 1912, to counter this flaw, the U.S. 
Congress enacted the Sherley Amendment that prohibited explicitly false therapeutic 
claims. However, in the following years, the consequences of the new law were 
practically nil, since it was still hard to prove something regarding the therapeutic 
effects of the drug through laboratory tests. The necessity to investigate in a more 
systematic way a method to test for drug efficacy was made clearer by some emerging 
scandals.  
One of the most striking was the case of Banbar, an old patent medicine 
advertised by the producer as a cure for diabetes. The drug was not dangerous per se, 
since it contained just inactive ingredients like milk, sugar and a grass plant known as 
“equisetum”. Nonetheless, it was obviously life threating for those who rejected insulin, 
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which had become a standard treatment short after its discovery in 1922 and whose 
effectiveness was beyond any dispute or doubt. Meanwhile, in 1927, the Bureau of 
Chemistry’s name was transformed into Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration, 
then abbreviated to the current version (FDA). In the 30s the “new” FDA accused the 
producer of Banbar of fraud and took to court all the evidence about the death of 
patients who had refused to take insulin in order to get Banbar. Conversely, in its 
defense, the producer of the drug took to the court testimonial letters, which 
consumers had written thanking him. Those letters were sufficient to demonstrate to 
the court his bona fides about the efficacy of the drug. Thus, the FDA did not get the 
authorization to seize the product, so it remained on the market (Junod 2008). 
These were the clear limits of the 1906 Act: it was more about basic chemical 
quality control (the drug actually had the ingredients it claimed it had) in order to 
protect consumers from frauds, and therefore preventing potential scandals, rather 
than addressing more relevant epistemic needs such as safety and efficacy. These 
would come in the following decades, when new scandals made it unavoidable. 
1.3 The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
In the wake of Banbar and other minor scandals, people started being more and more 
suspicious of pharmaceutical companies and drug trade. In those years, two books 
became very popular and influential among the public opinion: 100,000,000 Guinea 
Pigs: Dangers in Everyday Foods, Drugs, and Cosmetics by Arthur Kallet and F.J Schilnk 
(Kallet and Schlink 1932) and American Chambers of Horrors: the truth about food and 
drugs by Ruth deForest Lamb (deForest Lamb and Copeland 1936). The authors 
harshly criticized the FDA and the government for their failure in protecting people 
from the abuses and the frauds of drug companies. In particular, they pointed out all 
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the weakness of the 1906 Act, asking for an immediate update. Instead, at the very 
beginning the FDA reacted vindicating the success of all its activities. 
In the 1930s, more than a hundred companies were manufacturing drugs 
containing sulfanilamide (Marks 1997), a “wonder” antibacterial compound used to 
cure streptococcal infections. The company S. E. Massengill decided to produce syrup-
type sulfanilamide using diethylene glycol, an extremely toxic solvent. The syrup was 
placed on the market without any tests in animals or humans, causing at least 106 
documented deaths (Wax 1995). However, under the 1906 Act, the FDA could only 
prosecute Massengil for misbranding. The subsequent public outrage prompted the 
Congress to pass a new set of laws: the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The 1938 Act 
required companies to inform the FDA of their intention to put a new drug on the 
market. On the one hand, the FDA was given the power to ask for “adequate tests by all 
methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not the drug is safe”. The major 
concern of regulators in 1938 Act was the safety of the drugs, whereas they did not 
nearly consider the problem of evaluating the efficacy, which of course they soon 
bumped into. On the other hand, the 1938 Act did not make FDA approval a pre-
requisite for market access (Marks 1995).  
Let us focus on the kind of “adequate tests” required by the FDA as proof of the 
drug safety. Although these tests remained unspecified in the act, the regulators 
adopted the same standards already advocated by the AMA’s Council on Pharmacy and 
Chemistry: laboratory analysis and experts’ evaluation. Moreover, animal tests, even if 
not formally required, were systematically requested by the FDA and became soon a 
sort of gold standard for drug safety. This was one of the major novelties of the 1938 
Act. Another major accomplishment was the overcoming of the “fraud flaw” of 1906 
Act: the FDA could now remove from the market unsafe drugs without having to prove 
that there was intent of fraud on the part of the producer.  
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Already in 1938, the new Act was put to the test. In the spring of 1938 British 
researchers had discovered a new sulfonamide compound (2-para-aminobenzene 
pyridine), apparently better than every other sulfa drug. Experimental tests in mice 
showed low toxicity, few adverse side effects, and more beneficial effects than its 
predecessors. In October 1938, Merck & Company, an American company, submitted 
an application for the FDA to approve sulfapyridine for the treatment of pneumonia, for 
which there was no effective therapy yet. The FDA requested the opinion of the experts 
and clinicians who had had the opportunity to test the experimental drug. Some of 
them were reporting adverse events, some did not. On the drug’s efficacy, the data were 
even more unconvincing: the drug had been administered only to a few patients with 
pneumonia and it was still too early to judge its efficacy. This is why many skeptics 
were advising FDA to keep the application on hold since they were concerned about 
the risk-benefit balance. They were also concerned about the lack of data on the effects 
of sulfapyridine on other infectious diseases for which it might be prescribed. 
The FDA had adopted the view that the expert judgment of qualified clinical 
investigators should prevail over the opinion of regular clinicians. But in case of 
disagreement among the former, the debate would not be settled by the 
methodological superiority of their respective tests, but through the majority rule. 
Despite the pressure of the press, asking for a fast approval of the drug, and despite the 
incoming winter, a time when cases of pneumonia were obviously more frequent, the 
FDA kept collecting and reviewing data and experts’ opinions until the deadline 
provided for in the statute. On March 1939 the FDA decided to “not deny” (NB: 
officially, the act did not allow the FDA to approve a drug, but just gave to the agency 
the power to deny a request) the applications for sulfapyridine, provided that 
manufacturers explicitly reported on the labels and in advertising that the drug had to 
be used “under close, continuous observation of a qualified practitioner of medicine” 
29 
 
(Marks 1997). This is because some doubts remained about the efficacy of the drug as 
noted by Theodore Klumpp, by then chief of the Drug Division in the FDA: “While a few 
investigators recommended that the drug be withheld from the market such 
recommendations upon analysis do not appear to rest upon considerations of the 
intrinsic safety or danger of the drug. Principally those workers were concerned with 
the orderly development of medical scientific knowledge, concerning the therapeutic 
efficacy of the drug […]” (Marks 1997). The sulfapyridine was soon replaced by a more 
powerful drug, penicillin, so the extent of the FDA’s decision is not clear. But at least 
regarding the safety “adequate tests”, laboratory analysis and experts’ judgment, gave 
the impression to perform that task well. At least, it seemed so. 
What was clear among the medical community, at that point, was that the 
standards adopted by the FDA was far from being able to check for efficacy. Drug 
evaluation basically was left to the judgments and opinions of experts, which was 
considered superior to regular clinical judgment, and medical community thought to 
be reliable at least in spotting adverse effects. However, another scandal would soon 
undermine that belief and forced the FDA to reconsider again its regulations and 
standards. Developments outside the medical field, in statistics applied to agriculture 
to be exact, converged to make it possible. In the next paragraph we are going to briefly 
present major ones. 
1.4 Statistics: today’s innovations for tomorrow’s standards 
Physicians had been dealing with the variability of biological phenomena for centuries. 
They were always aware of the fundamental role of chance in medical observations: 
the natural course of the disease, spontaneous remissions, and responses to treatments 
were considerably different in each patient. Clinical measurement was not as uniform 
as laboratory tests. Therefore, physicians relied only on their experience in order to 
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handle uncertainty. This was the case also in comparative experiments. Indeed, 
knowledge of the variance of the diseases and of potential perturbing factors could be 
exploited then to perform comparative studies, trying to reduce the chance to a 
minimum. Of course, managing chance was considered fundamental for any 
comparative experiment. Therefore, their quality depended on the experience of the 
researcher. Still this approach had serious limitations because physicians’ knowledge 
of both confounding factors and the magnitude of natural random variability might be 
limited. What statistics could offer to clinical researchers was an experimental design 
that permitted to manage biological variability and chance regardless of previous 
knowledge. Generally, this breakthrough is credited to the genius of a British 
statistician and biologist, Sir Roland Aylmer Fisher (1890-1962). 
Fisher had been dealing with biological variability since 1919 when he began to 
work as statistician at the agricultural experimental station in Rothamsted. In fact, 
Fisher had to find a reliable method to solve some practical problems in agricultural 
research: Which varieties of seeds are better? Which fertilizer? Which crop rotation 
system is best? Simple comparisons cannot provide a reliable answer. Suppose that you 
observe a 10 percent difference in yields between two grain varieties: is it due to a real 
difference in the quality of the seeds or to plot conditions? One way to answer this is to 
rely on experience: an expert farmer could tell that a 10 percent difference is never due 
to plot conditions alone. Nonetheless for Fisher, this strategy was far from being 
scientific since it relied entirely on experts’ knowledge (i.e. subjective). Moreover, it 
would not be feasible if such previous knowledge were not available to anyone. 
Another option would be to replicate the experience many times, but this is rarely 
possible in agricultural practice. Indeed, Fisher calculated that it would require 
approximately five hundred years to find that such a 10 percent difference is due to 
chance alone, Fisher’s solution consisted in setting up a new experimental design. He 
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divided the experimental plots in strips in order to increase the number of 
observations in a single experiment. This way he reduced the variability of the effects 
due to other factors than a quality difference between grains. In other words, he 
increased the sample size of the experiment. But the most crucial innovation was to 
sow grain in strips in a random order. According to Fisher, randomization is the only 
mechanism that could ensure the validity of scientific inference in a comparative 
experiment. The randomization of the plots ensured that all the possible perturbing 
factors were equally distributed among all the strips. In Fisher’s own words, 
randomization helped to protect the experimenter from a devilish nature.  
According to Fisher randomization is essential not just for controlling for 
confounders, but also for the calculation of the probability of finding a given difference 
between the experimental treatments. This idea was illustrated by the famous thought 
experiment of the lady testing tea. Suppose, says Fisher, that a lady declares that she 
can tell whether milk or tea was poured first to a cup, just by tasting. What kind of 
experiment can one design to test her assertion? According to Fisher, it would consist 
in preparing 4 cups of tea pouring milk first and 4 pouring milk later and present them 
to the lady in a random order, determined by “the apparatus used in games of chance” 
(Fisher 1937). She has to spot the 4 cups prepared pouring milk first (or tea first). The 
random order in presenting her the cups is important, according to Fisher, because it 
guarantees that the probability of guessing rightly all the cups by chance is 1 out of 70. 
If the order is not random and the lady spots it in some way, the chance of guessing the 
cups right by chance increases and this can bias the result of the experiment. How many 
cups has she to guess right in order to prove her wonder tasting?  If she were right on 
every cup, of course, one should obviously accept it. But what about 3 rights and 1 
wrong for instance? One should set a threshold of “significance”, that is setting a degree 
of probability to refute what Fisher called the null hypothesis, our default assumption. 
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In this case, that the lady cannot tell whether it had been milk or tea. Conventionally 
this threshold is fixed at 5% (the standard level of statistical significance)2 and one 
should ignore all the results which fail to reach this standard. The probability of 
guessing 3 cups right and 1 wrong by chance is 16 out of 70, which is more than 20%. 
Thus, one should not discard the null hypothesis. One would be willing to do it if and 
only if the lady guesses right 4 cups out 4, for which the chance goes beyond 5%.  
As noted by Marks (Marks 1997), Fisher’s direct influence on biological and 
medical communities was negligible. It was Bradford Hill, a British statistician working 
on medical topics, who exported Fisher’s experimental design to drug testing in the 
1940s. Historians of medical statistics have argued, time and again, that British 
physicians did not grasp the statistical rationale of randomization (Armitage 1982; 
Chalmers 2011). There was instead a widespread concern among British doctors about 
the many ways in which personal biases could spoil the evaluation of novel therapies. 
They found in the randomized allocation of treatment a device that could neutralize 
the personal beliefs of investigators as to who would benefit most from the therapy. 
Allocation bias occurs when the allocation of subjects to study groups is jeopardized 
by the preferences of the experimenters (e.g. the healthiest or youngest patients 
receive the experimental treatment). Randomization can easily succeed in neutralizing 
this bias. However, there are many other biases which can occur in a comparative 
experiment. For instance, participants’ preferences can still spoil the result, 
conditioning the evaluation of the outcomes. If physicians want to favor the drug under 
testing, they could report better outcomes for the experimental drug and so could do 
patients as well. That is why we need another de-biasing method, such as blinding the 
allocation of treatments to physicians and patients. Randomization is an essential part 
                                                        




of blinding procedures, as regarded for Fisher. However, to be precise, it is not 
randomization per se, which guarantees the fairness of trials, but the experimental 
design as a whole, which includes basic statistical analysis such as test of significance 
and controls. “The use of properly designed clinical trials permits us to move from an 
authoritative frame of reference to a scientific one” (Marks 1997). 
Nevertheless, it took a decade to implement Fisher’s approach in medicine3: the 
first randomized controlled trial, with significance testing, took place in Britain in 
1947. It would take one more decade to spread among physicians and two more 
decades to transform it into a regulatory standard4. As it will be clear in the following 
section, it is always difficult to change the minds of scientists without empirical 
evidence, and to change the minds of politicians and regulators without scandals and 
public outrage. 
1.5 How randomized controlled trials became the gold standard 
In the years after the war, some major breakthroughs in clinical trials design were 
achieved in two independent studies of streptomycin. For the first time, researchers 
introduced in trials’ design a standardized set of controls that will become soon 
fundamental: a control group, the random allocation of patients, and standardized non-
qualitative criteria to assess outcome. In the U.S., the Public Health Serviced (PHS) 
organized a research study on streptomycin to treat tuberculosis. PHS researchers did 
not want to make the mistakes of their predecessors, so they strictly controlled the trial 
in order to get a reliable knowledge about the use of the drug. Moreover, the scarce 
                                                        
3 Actually, RCTs were initially resisted also in agriculture, and the competitor method – the half-drill 
strip – remained in wide use for a long time beyond the arrival of RCTs. This is because of their 
complexity and because it was nearly impossible for the farmers to understand it (see Berry, 2015). 
4 In the 1958 Donald Mainland, a medical statistician, attending a meeting of Endocrinology Society in 
San Francisco, noted a “statistical attidute” among the panelists. New concepts and methods were 
circulating, whereas just a decade before “anyone who advocated them was commonly regarded as an 
aberrant specimen” (Mainland 1960). 
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funding and limited amount of streptomycin available made it necessary to arrange 
comparative experiments in order to produce the best knowledge in the most efficient 
way. In order to control for the allocation bias, the study design included the 
randomization of treatments. PHS researchers' main concern was to avoid individual 
decisions of physicians, especially those who were already convinced of the beneficial 
effect of streptomycin. That is also why PHS researchers planned to conduct the entire 
study in a double-blind fashion, but they failed to convince the involved physicians. 
Nonetheless, the study produced reliable and uncontested results in favor of 
streptomycin. However, it employed only descriptive statistics, there was no use of 
statistical tests of significance.  
On the other side of the Atlantic, in 1947, the British Medical Research Council 
was conducting a very similar trial, which became known as the “first RCT” since it 
employed for the first time a standardized method for statistical inference. The 
scientist in charge was Sir Austin Bradford Hill, a relevant actor in the history of 
medicine. Indeed, he contributed much to the methodology of clinical trials, publishing 
a series of papers on medical statistics in The Lancet journal (1937) claiming the 
relevance of randomization and controls to ensure the objectivity of a study. In 
particular, Bradford Hill argued that the primary experimenter’s aim is “to ensure 
beforehand that, as far as possible, the control and treated groups are the same in all 
relevant respects” (Yoshioka 1998). Moreover, randomization was crucial to ensure 
the objective assessment of treatments since it removed personal responsibility from 
the clinician from selecting which patients would benefit. These two ideas shaped the 
rationale behind the design of MRC trial. The trial enrolled 107 patients randomized in 
two groups: 55 assigned to the experimental group receiving streptomycin and the 
standard of care (bed rest) and 52 to the control group receiving only bed rest. The 
radiologists who interpreted x-ray chest exams were blind to the allocation of the 
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treatments. After 6 months there were only 4 deaths in the streptomycin group, 
whereas there were 15 in the control. Investigators considered that difference 
statistically significant, “the probability of it occurring by chance is less than one in a 
hundred” (Marshall et al. 1948). For the first time both a method for minimize 
allocation bias and statistical evaluation of collected data were employed in a clinical 
trial. That is why Hill’s trial became (very slowly) a milestone and influenced an entire 
generation of physicians, even though it was not without opposition. 
Certainly, these trials had both a great and important weight in the history of 
medicine and clinical research, i.e. the exclusion of subjective judgments from drugs 
testing and evaluation. Rather than relying on conflicting opinions of individual 
physicians based on different standards, the new methodological standard provided a 
more objective and scientific tool to appraise therapeutic innovations. However, that 
standard was integrated into drug regulation more than a decade later, in the aftermath 
of further pharmaceutical scandals. 
The Fifties (and later the Sixties) were the golden age of antibiotics: more than 
400 drugs were introduced into the market each year (Meldrum 2000). Though, most 
of them were nothing but “me too drugs”, “which were defined as molecular alterations 
that did not show evidence of therapeutic superiority over the pioneer or, in the case 
of fixed-combination drugs, over the component drugs used alone” (Carpenter 2010). 
Pharmaceutical companies invested much in advertising, reporting published studies 
showing beneficial effects, but most of those reports were of questionable validity. 
Usually, pharmaceutical companies sent (directly or through a physician) some sample 
of their new drugs to the doctors for a try, asking them to report their experiences. Of 
course, this practice was completely unsatisfactory from a scientific point of view, and 
yet it was sufficient for receiving the FDA’s approval. As we mentioned above, the old 
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1938 statute did not provide methodological standards for clinical research, and its 
power to control access to market was limited. 
In 1958, the U.S. Senator Estes Kefauver held hearings on the drug industry. His 
main concern was the exorbitant profit margins of pharmaceutical companies, due 
mostly to antibiotics. The companies blamed it on the high costs of research since that 
many drugs failed during drug development. The hearings generated important 
evidence documenting the poor quality of clinical research supporting the marketing 
of many drugs. It revealed to the public what all the experts already knew: most of the 
clinical research was just rubbish.  
Another tragedy triggered the enactment of the Kefauver-Harris 1962 
Amendments of the 1938 Act and the subsequent Investigational New Drug 
Regulations in 1963. Kefauver’s hearing placed drug regulation on the top of the 
agenda of U.S politics. The story of thalidomide is well-known. As Daniel Carpenter has 
pointed out, the standard narrative comes from an American journalist, Morton Mintz, 
who published an article about thalidomide in the Sunday morning Washington Post 
on July 15, 1962. According to Carpenter “Mintz essentially re-interpreted bureaucratic 
nitpicking and deliberation […] as modern-day, scientific virtues that upheld 
protection of American families and infants” (Carpenter 2010). Thalidomide was a 
quite popular drug in Europe and especially in Western Germany, where the drug was 
manufactured by pharmaceutical company Chemie Grünenthal since 1957 and 
marketed as Contergan. The drug was prescribed to treat a great number of various 
symptoms, mostly psychological as anxiety or tension. But it was also administered to 
many pregnant women to alleviate nausea and sickness. This was the beginning of a 
tragedy for thousands of women around the world. Those who had taken thalidomide 
gave birth to children with phocomelia, a terrible congenital disorder involving limbs 
malformations, leading to premature death. In the U.S, the German company reached 
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an agreement with Richardson-Merrell to market the drug, and this latter filed the 
application for approval with the FDA in 1961 when evidence of thalidomide side 
effects started to be reported. Both the German and the American companies denied 
the link between the cases of phocomelia and its product. As part of the approval 
process, the drug was distributed to many physicians in the U.S for testing purposes. 
But, at the FDA, one of the physicians reviewing thalidomide approval, Dr. Frances 
Oldham Kelsey, decided to withhold it asking for more clinical tests, because evidence 
of serious adverse effects was already appearing in Germany and in other 20 countries 
where the drug had been approved. Kelsey’s decision was indeed a great and fortunate 
one and it has secured her a place in history. Unfortunately, the testing samples still 
caused 17 reported cases of phocomelia. Under public pressure and after a rush 
discussion, the Congress passed in 1962 a new pharmaceutical regulatory framework, 
inspired by Kelsey’s precautionary attitude. First, it introduced a system of control by 
FDA over clinical experimentation, assigning an IND (Investigational New Drug) status 
to experimental drugs, and nullifying this status if clinical trial protocols were not 
methodologically sound or patients’ rights were not respected. Second, it removed the 
“automatic” approval by default after 60 days: drugs needed a “positive” approval by 
the FDA to enter the market. And third, above all, it required “substantive evidence” of 
effectiveness based on “well-controlled studies”, in addition to the pre-clinical 
demonstration of safety. The lawmakers left the task of better specifying the meaning 
of those expressions to FDA experts and officers, who saw the minimum standard in 
“randomized controlled trials”. Moreover, the 1963 IND rules shaped somehow the 3-
phases structure of drug testing, the form DF 1571 listed for the first time three phases 
of trial: 
“a. Clinical pharmacology. This is ordinarily divided in two 
phases: Phase 1 starts when the new drug is first introduced into men 
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[…]; phase 2 covers the initial trials on a limited number of patients for 
specific disease control […]. b. Clinical trial. This phase 3 provides the 
assessment of the drug’s safety and effectiveness […]. A reasonable 
protocol is developed on the basis of the facts accumulated in the 
earlier phases, including completed and submitted animal studies”. 
This phase is conducted by separate groups following the same 
protocol […] to produce well-controlled clinical data” (Carpenter 
2010).  
Let us focus briefly on this division, since it provides additional evidence to our 
claim that RCTs become the gold standard in medical research because they better 
served the political goals of regulators, compared to animal experiments and experts 
judgment. Indeed, it is the design of phase III trials that makes possibile to objectivly 
assess the safety and efficacy of a drug, all the previous phases are pointless to this 
epistemic aim. However, as it was already clear at that time, RCTs were quite 
challenging and demanding experiments requiring many patients in order to allow 
correct statistical inferences - “the method of controlled trials is still in its infancy; that, 
although the principles are simple, the art is extremely difficult” (Mainland 1960). 
Intuitevly, running big experiments in humans can rise a medical scandal as well, 
exposing many individuals to a drug that can be potentially toxic. This possibility would 
result in an even bigger scandal than thalidomide, making the fears of early critics of 
pharmaceutical industry (Kallet & Schlink 1932) true: actually turning people into 
guinea pigs5. Therefore, the early phases were introduced in order to provide 
preliminary evidence of safety, before exposing many patients to the drug. From a 
                                                        
5 Some years later (1972) the infamous Tuskgee study of syphillis (1972) led to further major changes 
in U.S. law and regulation on the protection of participants in clinical studies. It is no coincidence that 
recent medical scandals and public concerns over clinical research have been triggered mostly by 
accidents during the experimental phases (see, Eddleston, Cohen, & Webb 2016), rather than post-
market failuress (e.g. drugs withdrawals). 
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purely epistemic point of view these phases are negligible, but from a political point of 
view they served to protect consumers from medical disasters. 
We have provided some historical evidence to warrant the idea that a series of 
pharmaceutical scandals pushed drug regulation in the US in the direction of tighter 
and tighter controls, leading ultimately to the adoption of RCTs as the current safety 
and efficacy standard. In conclusion, RCTs have been adopted in response to the 
pressure of pharmaceutical consumers in Western democracies through parliaments. 
1.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have tried to provide a straightforward answer to the question “Why 
do we need randomized controlled trials?”, without engaging controversial 
epistemological features, such as causality assessment. To this end, we have briefly 
traced the history of drug regulation in order to understand why randomized 
controlled trials have been adopted as the gold standard for drug testing. To sum up, 
we have shown that at the beginning of the last century the drug trade grew and 
expanded quickly. Soon, emerging scandals made clear that some producers were 
selling fake drugs, making remarkable profits. Then, quality controls were adopted as 
the first standard for drug regulation: chemical laboratory tests became necessary in 
order to get market approval. In the following years, developments of new drugs led to 
some safety issues. Laboratory tests alone could not deal with safety of compounds, for 
which instead a very different standard was necessary, and animal pre-clinical 
research was still quite unreliable. Regulators relied then on experts’ judgment and 
their clinical experience in order to control safety. However, very soon another issue 
came at stake: it was not possible to assess the safety of the drug regardless of its 
efficacy, and expert’s deliberation was inadequate to account for it. Often it was 
impossible to reach a consensus among clinicians, especially about the efficacy of a 
40 
 
drug. At the same time, innovations in the design of experiments and statistics emerged 
outside the medical field, and gave the opportunity to the medical community to 
conceive and conduct methodologically sound comparative experiments to test 
innovative treatments, i.e. RCTs. Despite some early successful applications of the new 
experimental design in the context of medical testing, FDA had neither the political nor 
the scientific authority to set new standards for clinical research. Indeed, the FDA held 
its previous standards until another tragedy occurred in 1962. Thalidomide scandal 
forced regulators to revise their previous decisions, and to finally implement 
randomized controlled trials as the gold standard for drug testing. Once again, a 
scandal was crucial in triggering a reform of drug regulation. 
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2. MORE THAN ONE WAY TO MEASURE: A CASUISTIC 
APPROACH TO CANCER CLINICAL TRIALS 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their 
eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the 
way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and 
leads the philosopher into complete darkness” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Blue and Brown Books). 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the last years, science and technology have made great progress towards a better 
understanding of fundamental biological mechanisms of the diseases. Physicians, 
relying just on their own clinical experience, have long recognized that each patient is 
different from every other patient in many aspects. It is a matter of simple facts that 
many patients died without responding to any treatment, while others with the same 
(supposed) disease perfectly survived1. Notably, in oncology the variability of 
treatment response has been a long-standing problem.  Nowadays, thanks to genomics 
ad post-genomics advancements we are now finding out an indication for that 
individual variability: tumor heterogeneity. Now, we know that each tumor has a 
different genomic basis despite its site of occurrence. This means that a lung cancer, 
for example, can have a molecular profile more similar to a melanoma than to another 
                                                        
1 First evidence of individual variability dates back to the 6th century BC, when Pythagoras noted that 




lung cancer. In addition, every type of human cancer is comprised of subsets of 
different cell populations, with a different genetic background, meaning that, in theory, 
every cancer patient, from a genomic standpoint, might have an orphan disease.  
On the one hand, the genomic complexity of cancer makes the treatment of the 
disease highly inefficient with most of the current chemotherapies. Indeed, tumor 
heterogeneity is a key determinant of tumor progression and a leading cause of failure 
of current anti-cancer treatments and emergence of drug-resistance (Diaz et al. 2012): 
tumors harboring different aberrations respond differently to the same drugs. On the 
other hand, the better the understanding of tumor heterogeneity the higher the chance 
to exploit it for treatments, and this is going to revolutionize the way we understand 
medicine.  
Also, from a more theoretical point of view, tumor heterogeneity is posing many 
epistemological challenges that have not been discussed extensively by philosophers 
of science, with some noteworthy exceptions (Bertolaso 2011; Boniolo and Nathan 
2016; Germain 2012; Plutynski 2013). For instance, Boniolo (Boniolo and Nathan 
2016) argues that tumor heterogeneity is a major drive of methodological revolution 
of molecular medicine, that is the practice of medicine informed by the discoveries of 
molecular biology. Historically, clinical and experimental methods have been 
conceived as diametrically opposed to each other: the former dealing with the 
individual/particular, the latter dealing with the general/universal. Nowadays the two 
methods somehow fuse together in a sort of “hybrid method totally unthinkable” in the 
past (Boniolo and Nathan 2016). This novelty is epitomized by the introduction into 
molecular biology laboratories of new experimental models: the so-called primary 
tumor cell cultures, that are cells directly derived from a patient's primary tumor tissue 
sample; the patient-derived tumor xenografts, immunodeficient mice implanted with 
patients’ tumors, and IPSc, reprogrammed stem cells from patients’ fibroblasts which 
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may be further differentiated into cell lines which otherwise would be particularly 
difficult to obtain, such as neurons. All these cutting-edge methods aim at creating 
some sort of avatars of human patients in order to bring the clinic into the lab, allowing 
the researchers to study the individual with the methods of experiments and controls 
which are typical of the “science of universal”.  
Unravelling the basis of individual variability and hijacking cancer genomes 
seems the right strategy to win the “war on cancer”. However, the methodological 
revolution described by Boniolo has not yet had a counterpart in clinical research, and 
this represents a concrete bottleneck for therapeutic progress (Richard Simon 2010). 
In this chapter, we question the resistance to change of the current drug regulatory 
paradigm. We present our case in the following order. At first, we discuss the 
implications of tumor heterogeneity for regulatory assessment of new medications, 
considering the challenges that the current paradigm is facing. Secondly, we take into 
account some criticisms that could explain its resistance to change. Finally, moving 
towards a normative approach, we propose a method, borrowed from bioethics, that 
could overcome those criticisms.  
2.2 Tumor heterogeneity and its implications for clinical research 
Recent technological breakthroughs, namely next-generation sequencing (NGS) and 
single-cell sequencing, have allowed to observe genetic variations at the single-
nucleotide level between different types of tumors (intertumor heterogeneity), as well 
as between individual tumors (intratumor heterogeneity). Two levels of intratumor 
heterogeneity are generally recognized: genetic and phenotypic (Shibata and Shen 
2013).  For practical purposes in this chapter we are focusing on the former, leaving 
aside the latter. As already mentioned, with tumor heterogeneity we mean the 
presence of high numbers of somatic mutations within individual tumors, while some 
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of these are found at high allelic frequencies and are likely to appear early during tumor 
evolution, others are present at lower frequencies within tumor sub-clones and are 
acquired later (Hou et al. 2012). Tumors harboring a certain mutation could be more 
vulnerable and respond better to specific therapeutic agents. This variability could be 
exploited to develop either new combinations of drugs or even new targeted drugs, in 
order to provide the best therapeutic strategy for each patient. With regard to this, 
vemurafenib is the classic example. It has been developed in order to treat a subset of 
patients with late-stage melanoma harboring V600 BRAF mutation, and it has proven 
quite effective (Hyman et al. 2015). In the aftermath of that success, many mutations 
have been identified as vulnerable, druggable with new compounds or repositioning 
old ones. For example, in 2012 (Iyer et al. 2012) individuated two specific mutations 
(TSC1, NF2) in the genome of a patient with metastatic bladder cancer, who achieved 
a complete response after being treated with everolimus (an mTOR inhibitior). This 
finding showed the feasibility of exploiting tumor heterogeneity for therapeutic 
interest, but the patients which could benefit are few: TSC1 and NF2 genes are mutated 
only in a small minority of bladder cancers (Guo et al. 2013). This rarity makes testing 
claims of efficacy of targeted therapies particularly troublesome. 
Briefly, since their introduction into drug regulation, in order to better warrant 
efficacy claims, phase III trials (RCTs) have become more and more rigorous, 
implementing robust statistical analysis, adopting hard and validated endpoints, and 
hardening procedures and protocols. They also became larger and larger, enrolling 
always more patients in order to detect even small differences and to better spot side 
effects (Yusuf, Collins, and Peto 1984). The downside is that nowadays RCTs are usually 
cumbersome experiments, expensive and costly. Nonetheless, over the years, clinical 
researchers and regulators have been almost blind to alternatives. Nothing has 
changed compared to the past: large trials (large populations for statistical power), 
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hypothesis testing, and control for type 1 error are still considered the yardstick. That 
is perfectly fine for many but not for every treatment, as for instance targeted therapies 
(Kirk and Hutchinson 2012; Rubin and Gilliland 2012; Sharma and Schilsky 2011; 
Bothwell et al. 2016).  
Let us imagine a typical scenario in which some investigators want to compare 
a new treatment to an old one for lung cancer in a standard trial design. Suppose that 
the primary endpoint is the risk reduction in a negative event (e.g. death or recurrence 
of disease), let's say a 25% risk reduction for instance. Then suppose that the desired 
power of the study is 0.9, meaning that investigators want to be 90% sure of detecting 
that risk reduction in mortality, and with a 5% two-sided type-1 error rate (that is the 
standard level of statistical significance). On the basis of prior knowledge, it is 
legitimate to guess that the median time to the event in the control arm is 3 years. So 
far, no complications would arise. Now, imagine that the treatment, which the 
investigators would like to test, is a new compound whose efficacy has been shown in 
previous phases of trials only in patients who carry a specific genetic mutation, and 
that this population is only 3% of the total lung cancer patients. Sticking to the 
traditional trial design, no experiment would be feasible. Indeed, being optimistic, in 
that case, the accrual rate would be 4 patients per month. Then, with a minimum 
follow-up of 3 years, about 650 patients should be enrolled to meet the optimal sample 
size. This means that such a trial, in the best case, would report results in 16 years (see 
Berry 2015). To conduct a trial with a more manageable sample size the investigators 
should increase the expected risk reduction to 65% and reduce the power to a more 
reasonable 0.8, but such an effect is quite simply unrealistic for any cancer drug: if a 
drug would decrease the risk of mortality of 65% percent, it would not be even 
necessary to conduct an RCT to prove it.  The bottom line of this thought experiment is 
that almost nobody would test a drug in a small population given the current regulatory 
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system. This is because the regulators would consider that evidence insufficient to 
grant market approval. As the biostatistician Donald Berry put it, "We speak of false 
negatives and false positives, but both are dwarfed by false neutrals, therapies that 
have not been and may never be evaluated in clinical trials” (Berry 2015). 
2.3 Alternative trial designs 
The field of trial designs research has been active since the early 80s. But just recently, 
the awareness of the fact that standard large RCTs are no longer an adequate tool for 
the evaluation of many treatments, especially new cancer drugs, has triggered the birth 
of many alternative approaches. In the wake of personalized medicine, much effort has 
been done to include the use of biomarkers in clinical research. With regard to this, for 
instance, a recent review of the new trial designs for therapies targeting patient subsets 
(Renfro et al. 2016) counted at least 7 categories of them: enrichment design; 
biomarker-by treatment interaction design; multi-target, multi-agent biomarker 
strategy design; biomarker design with response-adaptive randomization; umbrella 
trial; and basket trial. However, they all share one common feature: they employ an 
"adaptive design". This latter is a label for those approaches that allow for adaptations 
of the study protocol while the trial is still ongoing, on the basis of the information 
collected and generated during the trial. "Adaptations" can be various and include, for 
instance, changes in groups size, adjustment in treatment dosage, or even dropping an 
arm of the study. These features make this kind of trials appropriate for testing cancer 
drugs since they can also include a biomarker to identify the class of patient that would 
benefit. Adaptive designs deliver many other advantages. First of all, adaptive 
approaches can reduce the sample size needed to detect the supposed effect, therefore 
reducing also the cost and time needed to complete the trial. Second, adaptive designs 
are also considered more ethical than standard RCTs, since they minimize the chance 
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of exposure to a therapy that is not effective2. Lastly, adaptive designs have a pragmatic 
sharp-edge: they can shorten the drug development and the approval path, and this 
can incentive drug companies to invest more in the drug discovery endeavor. 
However, some serious critiques to adaptive trials may be listed. The most 
pressing one is that, so far, every single "adaptive trial" has employed a different study 
protocol. They can also require indifferently either a frequentist or a Bayesian 
statistical analysis, these latter being particularly complex. So, since these study 
protocols can be very intricate and cumbersome, "clear and pervasive evidence would 
recede behind the [statistical] veil" (Caplan, Plunkett, and Levin 2015). Moreover, 
given their adaptive nature, such experiments can hardly be replicable: of course, the 
information generated and collected in a trial can be completely different from that 
generated in another trial, despite the adoption of the same initial protocol. This non-
replicability makes them suspect. Indeed, the FDA guidelines on adaptive trials clearly 
eschew those designs that are not “well-understood” (ibid).  
Usually, defenders of RCTs argue that any trial which does not include a 
statistical significance test will never produce “objective” knowledge. This belief is 
based on the shared perception that the classical/frequentist test of statistical 
significance is an objective and impartial assessment of a trial’s result. Although, this 
granted epistemic superiority is quite controversial (Teira 2011). But the most 
pressing reason explaining regulators’ reluctance towards endorse adaptive trial 
designs is the potential lack of a yardstick. FDA experts, for instance, are aware of the 
limitations of RCTs and frequentist statistical inference. However, they are willing to 
pay this price in order to avoid a pluralism of criteria and methods that would be 
                                                        




practically impossible to manage. As Robert Temple (Deputy Director for Clinical 
Sciences at the FDA) once put it: 
“Of course, everybody knows that "P < 0.05"J is sort of stupid. 
Why should it always be the same? Why shouldn't it be adjusted to the 
situation, to the risks of being wrong in each direction? The alternative 
to adopting a standard is to actually determine a criterion for success 
on the spot for each new case. That is my idea of a nightmare. So, we 
use a foolish, if you like, simplification. […] I don't want to have a 
symposium for every new trial to decide on an acceptable level of 
evidence. My point is that all of these things need to be well enough 
understood so we can actually implement procedures that won't drive 
everybody crazy, that won't involve constant arguments about the 
strength or nature of each assumption every time” (Berry et al. 2005). 
Temple does not neglect the epistemic value of methodological pluralism, and 
he acknowledges that having just one way to evaluate and approve a new drug is just a 
sub-optimal procedure. Yet, the aim of FDA is not to increase scientific knowledge, 
giving a reliable answer to a scientific question, but rather guarantee to consumers 
both access to drugs and protection from severe adverse effects, with the final aim of 
improving health in the general population. Then, paradoxically, lack of 
standardization could slow down the path for approval rather than speed it up, and 
could open the door to intentional bias. 
Generally speaking, in the field of methodology of clinical research two views 
emerged: that of "conservatives" (Cox, Borio, and Temple 2014; Joffe 2014; Rid and 
Emanuel 2014; Nelson et al. 2015) who uphold the use of the gold-standard (RCTs) in 
all clinical research without exception; and the view of "reformists" (Caplan, Plunkett, 
and Levin 2015; Adebamowo et al. 2014; Simon et al. 2015; Hohl 2015), who instead 
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consider the use of alternative trial designs justified under some circumstances. There 
are both epistemological and ethical reasons supporting the two positions.  
At the basis of the conservatives' argument lay some well-known reasons, 
endorsed especially by the mainstream fringe of the medical community: RCTs are the 
only experimental design that justifies an objective and reliable scientific inference. 
This is because in a double-blind RCT we can put in place a series of controls in order 
to prevent any bias that could spoil the validity of the result. In particular, 
randomization with a control group is held to be the best way to minimize confounding 
factors. Moreover, since the use of human subjects in clinical research is justified only 
to the extent to which the experiment provides a reliable answer to the scientific 
question under investigation, so that the result can provide a clear benefit for all the 
other people, RCTs have also a legitimization from an ethical point of view. For 
instance, conservatives claim that without a concurrent randomized control group, the 
evidence concerning drug efficacy and safety will be compromised and the trial might 
produce misleading results. That is also why other trial designs are not only 
methodologically flawed but also unethical. In few words, alternative designs might do 
more harm than good to future patients. 
Resistance to change by the conservatives is due especially to a "belief that in 
any research endeavor one must always test a null hypothesis with adequate control 
of the type 1 error rate concerning declaring false positive results" (Caplan, Plunkett, 
and Levin 2015). This explains also the general reluctance to adopt Bayesian statistics, 
for instance. We do not want to engage the never-ending debate between Bayesians 
and frequentists about the foundations of statistical inference, but we want to highlight 
a simple and straightforward fact, that there are many cases of "inquiries" in which 
testing a null hypothesis simply makes no sense at all. Consider, for instance, a coach 
who must select the best football players for his team. It does not make any sense to 
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test the null-hypothesis that "no player is any better than any other player – or worse, 
testing the null hypothesis that Johnny can't [kick] better than a placebo" (ibid.). 
Without going so far away, even when one must decide to choose which investment 
put in his own portfolio testing the null sounds pretty ridiculous. This is because the 
goals are completely different, what we need in cases like these is just “to select the 
best option and move forward” (ibid.). The goodness of the choice does not rely on the 
method by which that choice has been made, rather it is assessed by means of other 
criteria, saying, for instance, empirical success. As we already suggest elsewhere (see 
chapter 3) drug withdrawals for safety reasons are an appropriate empirical 
benchmark to assess the quality of regulatory decision making. Instead, coming back 
to our fictional examples, the coach who will win the league has likely made the best 
choices. 
From the 60s on, in biomedical research, RCTs became the gold standard 
methodology for fulfilling many different tasks, from taking decisions regarding the 
licensing of new drugs, to informing medical practice (e.g. EBM). In all these cases RCTs 
have shown to meet some practical challenges, which render their results quite useless 
for the aims they are intended for. We have already seen some of their practical 
limitations for testing a special class of cancer drugs, but it is almost the same for 
preventive research (Golfam et al. 2015), or for neurosurgery interventions (Mansouri 
et al. 2015). Time and again, new experimental designs have been proposed in order to 
overcome the limits of the RCTs in order to get a meaningful answer to the question 
under investigation. The idea is quite convincing: disregarding statistical 
considerations, following stubbornly a recipe for which one cannot get the right 
ingredients is irrational, to say the least. For instance, as many epidemiologists and 
philosophers of science have often argued (Vandenbroucke 2004, 2008; Osimani 2013) 
(Vandenbroucke 2004, 2008, Osimani 2013, Russo 2014), under certain circumstances 
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a well-designed observational study can provide a better answer to a scientific 
question rather than a poorly designed and performed randomized controlled trial. As 
Federica Russo (Russo 2014) put it, picking up an old British adage, “the proof of the 
pudding is in the eating, not in the gold standard recipe”. This is to say that the quality 
of regulatory decision making does not depend only on the methods which have been 
employed in the process. 
2.4 A casuistic approach to cancer clinical trials  
Recently, philosophers of science (Hey and Kesselheim 2016) have argued that the gold 
standard for testing treatments presupposes agnosticism about underlying biological 
theories. Indeed, as very often it has been the case, RCTs can effectively test the efficacy 
of some drugs, even without a theoretical understanding of the biological mechanism 
explaining why the drug is effective. As described in a masterly manner by (Keating 
and Cambrosio 2012), since the beginning of cancer pharmacological research, 
researchers and research institutions, such as NIH, have employed a high-throughput 
approach: screening for those chemicals and natural compounds among many, which 
could have a cytotoxic effect in vitro. That was basically the mainstream line of research 
until the 90s, when genetics and genomics had a great boost due to many important 
scientific breakthroughs, the achievement of the Human Genome Project in 2003 above 
all. As a result, in the era of personalized medicine, there is a clear biological hypothesis 
under testing in a clinical trial, for instance: “Treatment T is effective for condition C, 
as defined by testing positive for biomarker B, where B is determined by diagnostic 
assay A” (Hey and Kesselheim 2016). But this hypothesis encompasses different 
additional assumptions, such as "why A is a reliable test for B" or "why B should predict 
activity of T against C" (ibid.). These additional assumptions are tested long before the 
hypothesis reaches the phase of clinical testing. If the assumptions hold, then it might 
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be reasonable to even accept less robust statistical evidence, since it is supported by 
an underlying biological understanding. From this perspective, it is hard to argue that 
if we dispense with RCTs then we are decreasing the evidential standard and putting 
future patients at more risk. However, only a proper appraisal of the strength of 
evidence (biological and statistical) in each single case can allow reliable regulatory 
decision making. To this regard, it seems inevitable for the FDA to discuss and 
deliberate on every single new trial. Yet, this does not mean that the approval process 
would necessarily turn into a "nightmare". It might be just a matter of changing the 
approach to drug regulation for a special class of drugs and invest on it. There is no 
need to have a symposium for every registration trial in order to reach a consensus and 
a decision, it might be sufficient to adopt a casuistic approach.  
Let me briefly illustrate it. The casuistry is a very old approach to moral 
decision-making and practical ethics. There are some traces of it already in the Talmud, 
particularly in the hermeneutical rules to interpret the precepts of the Pentateuch. 
Some elements of the casuistry method are present also in the work of Cicero (De 
Officis, De inventione), but mostly in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, which inspired greatly the 
casuistry of the late medieval and early modern age. In this latter period, the casuistry 
took on a more organized shape thanks to the work of the Jesuits. The method was 
“invented” in order to solve a pressing issue at that time: the problem of “doubtful 
conscience”, i.e. what to do in all those cases in which it is not clear what is the best 
moral decision to make. People of medieval and early modern age were used to ask for 
advice to their confessors, who were often in trouble in giving the right advice. In that 
context, the casuistry method consisted of the technique (or art) of giving answers to 
specific moral questions without justifying them through moral principles, but just 
using an approach which we could define "topical" or "comparative-inductive". The 
idea was to assume an index case, which was sharp and clear, and then to analyze the 
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new cases by analogical reasoning. The big advantage of casuistry was that it did not 
require any agreement on ethical theories or moral principles, but just a consensus on 
the conclusions of the index cases. This method has been on the edge until the second 
half of the seventh century, when it was harshly criticized especially by Jansenist 
philosophers, such as for instance Blaise Pascal. 
More recently, in the context of contemporary debate on methods of bioethics, 
the casuistry has been recovered by Jonsen and Toulmin (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988). 
The starting point is the criticism to the Beauchamp and Childress’ leading bioethical 
paradigm (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). According to Jonsen and Toulmin the 
method of the principles, which deductively infer moral conclusions from accepted 
general moral principles, is too rigid and dogmatic. The two bioethicists then suggest 
recovering the casuistry method, since it implies less demanding assumptions. In fact, 
as just mentioned, it is not a top-down approach, but it requires accepting a conclusion 
of an index case and then comparing a new case to it, according to similarities and 
differences, in order to assess whether the new case can be part of the same class of 
the index one or not. The idea is that it is much easier to agree on an index case rather 
than accepting general moral principles. Following this sort of reasoning, it is possible 
to reach a conclusion which is only “probable” and not “certain”. Nonetheless, 
sometimes it is more convenient to set the bar a little bit lower, in order to pursue the 
aim of reaching a large consensus on a moral case. In the index cases the conclusions 
are usually very sharp and indisputable. For instance, there is no doubt that one is 
morally obligated to return money to a friend who lent him some. However, is not 
equally clear that one must return to a friend a weapon with which this latter wants to 
commit murder. In this latter case, we assist a common conflict between moral 
rules/norms: returning money lent, and not being an accessory to murder. The 
strength of the casuistry method is precisely being theory-independent (i.e. moral 
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judgments are not validly deduced from the universal principles of this and that ethical 
theory), hence more suitable to generate a wide consensus. Jonsen and Toulmin got 
inspiration also from the experience of the National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research that in the 70s, in the 
aftermath of the Tuskegee scandal, was called upon to establish the ethical limits and 
set the policies of biomedical research in the U.S (Varmus and Satcher 1997). The 
members of the Commission had varied backgrounds and expertise (they included 
philosophers, psychologists, theologians, medical scientists, etc.) representing 
different categories of stakeholders (men and women, Catholics, Protestants, Jews, 
etc.). Because of those differences, before the Commission’s work started, few 
observers expected the members to find an agreement either on general principles or 
on particular problems. Nevertheless, so long as the commissioners stood on the cases, 
they generally agreed on their practical conclusions. Instead, when they explained the 
reasons justifying their judgments, an open disagreement emerged. The philosophical 
wonder stems from the fact that in the Commission’s discussions the locus of moral 
certitude did not lie in general principles but rather “in a shared perception of what 
was specifically at stake in particular kinds of human situations” (Jonsen and Toulmin 
1988). It is clear that this perspective moral decision making requires a sort of 
“practical wisdom” (phronesis, a concept notoriously borrowed from Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics): the more this capacity, the better the judgments.  
Broadly speaking, over the years, bioethicists have largely preferred the rival 
method of the principles, as many have raised serious questions about the justification 
power of casuistry, despite its appeal. Often, casuists rely on social consensus to decide 
the paradigmatic cases, and critics argue that such a consensus is hardly reachable in 
the real-world scenario. Then, if there is not sufficient warranty for the decision about 
the paradigmatic cases, casuistic arguments are epistemically defective. Moreover, 
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even if we could agree about the paradigmatic case, one can still deny that the case 
under investigation is similar in any meaningful way, bringing out the dissimilarities 
between the two cases. So, lack of consensus would undermine also the casuistic based 
moral reasoning. Considering this, we think it is fair to say that the casuistic reasoning 
is epistemically vulnerable in many cases. Although this does not render casuistry 
useless, “it shows that its conclusions are tentative at best” (Spielthenner 2016). A 
consensus on moral decisions is hardly reachable despite the method because moral 
cases are often very blurry. Moreover, one could argue that in the interpretation of 
moral cases one cannot get along without an ethical theory.  
Nonetheless, in the regulatory decision setting, we are dealing with a rather 
different kind of cases, on which we can fairly easily suspend our judgment on 
principles. For instance, frequentist and Bayesian statisticians would hardly agree 
about the foundations of statistical inference and the epistemic import of different 
study designs. Indeed, the relative merit of the Bayesian and frequentist approaches 
continues to be the subject of debate. However, on the one hand, Bayesians do not hold 
that all the regulatory decisions based on results from standard RCTs are poor, just 
because they require a frequentist framework. Otherwise, they should be skeptical also 
about almost all the results of every scientific discipline, since frequentism is the 
current dominant paradigm. On the other hand, frequentist statisticians do not deny 
the reliability of many studies that employ a Bayesian statistical analysis. For example, 
in 2003 the Center for Drugs and Experimental Research of the FDA approved 
Pravigard Pac (Bristol-Myers Squibb) based on Bayesian analyses of efficacy (Berry 
2006; Jack Lee and Chu 2012), and so far no one has complained about that decision, 
meaning that, once it reached the market, the drug efficacy did not disappear nor 
showed unexpected severe adverse effects. Therefore, we think that reaching a 
consensus on some paradigmatic cases for regulatory decisions is not only possible but 
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also desirable. Ideally, this would allow the FDA experts to exploit the methodological 
pluralism, shorten the approval path for drug clinical development, and satisfy the 
interests of all the stakeholders. The casuistic approach would be an intermediate way 
between the current one-size-fits-all approach, which has been shown to be inadequate 
for testing molecularly targeted drugs, resolving the risk of having a symposium for 
every new trial to decide on an acceptable level of evidence, which would sink the FDA 
into a decisional quagmire. 
2.5 Potential paradigmatic case: crizotinib 
As stated above, the conservatives would never agree with the reformists about the 
possibility of getting a reliable result from a study design that does not provide a 
control group. There is no way by which they can agree on that on the basis of their 
theories about experimental design and statistical inference. Let us consider then the 
story of clinical development and approval of crizotinib as a potential paradigmatic 
case that we think might reconcile the conservatives and reformists.  
Crizotinib is a small-molecule that acts competitively inhibiting the ATP pocket 
of ALK, MET, and ROS1 kinases (Selaru et al. 2016). In physiological conditions, kinases 
provide proliferation signals phosphorylating target proteins. When mutated, they 
trans-autophosphorylate and result in potent tumorigenic drivers that activate 
downstream oncogenic signals, leading to aberrant cell proliferation and survival. The 
inhibition of those genes should then block this mechanism of action. Crizotinib was 
originally synthesized in 2005 precisely as an inhibitor of one of those kinases: the 
hepatocyte growth factor receptor (HGFR). Subsequently, it was found to inhibit 
phosphorylation of NPM-ALK in anaplastic large-cell lymphoma cells (ALCL). Also, ALK 
kinases have been found chromosomally rearranged in non-small cell lung cancer 
(NSCLC) with EML4 (Soda et al. 2007) 
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Crizotinib received accelerated approval by the FDA in August 2011 for the 
treatment of patients with locally advanced or metastatic ALK-positive NSCLC 
(Kazandjian et al. 2014), basically 6 years after the initial discovery of the molecule, 
that is a very short time considering that in general a drug takes about 10-15 years to 
enter the market. The crizotinib approval was based on the data from two open-label, 
single arm, phase I and II clinical trials: PROFILE 1001 and PROFILE 1005 (Ou 2011), 
respectively. Initially, the former, as all the phase I trials, recruited patients with 
various advanced solid tumors resistant to standard chemotherapy, in order to 
determine the maximum tolerated dose (MTD) of the drug. Once established the MTD, 
the study evaluated the safety and antitumor activity, first in patients who harbored 
MET amplifications (Ou et al. 2012) Then, after the discovery of ALK gene 
rearrangements in 2007 (Soda et al. 2007), a cohort of patients with ALK-positive 
NSCLC was added to the study in 2008. Since it was a phase I trial, PFS (progression 
free survival) was not one of the main outcomes, although the median PFS of 10 months 
was astonishing considering that in general, with standard therapy, it is about 3 
months. Moreover, crizotinib was well tolerated with minor adverse events. So, on the 
basis of these early promising results, in 2010 a phase II study started. The PROFILE 
1005 primary objectives were antitumor activity and safety, but, as all the phase II 
trials, the investigators began to collect also some efficacy outcomes in addition to PFS. 
The 136 patients enrolled had an ORR (objective response rate)3 of 51% and a duration 
response rate of 41.9 weeks (Crino et al. 2011). Furthermore, safety data were 
consistent with those observed in PROFILE 1001. As stated above, in 2011 crizotinib 
obtained the FDA accelerated approval based on these data. 
                                                        
3 The FDA defines ORR as the proportion of patients with a tumor size reduction of a predefined 
amount and for a minimum period of time. 
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Clinical development of crizotinib had to face many challenges, not least the 
small population of the ALK-positive NSCLC, which is, as explained above, one of the 
major obstacles in testing targeted (or personalized) treatments. Moreover, historical 
data on typical end points in that specific population as well as information on natural 
history of the diseases were lacking: because the relevance of ALK mutation was 
unknown, physicians never screened patients for that mutation. This made the 
interpretation of the results of the crizotinib trials particularly challenging since there 
was not any control arm nor any historical controls to compare with. In order to 
overcome this problem, investigators performed some simulations to predict the 
outcomes of virtual controls (see Selaru et al. 2016).  
We firmly believe that even the most reactionary defender of RCTs could not 
neglect the epistemic import of the crizotinib trials nor could deny the validity of their 
results. So, in principle, they could also agree that under specific conditions a small trial 
- without any control group - can effectively lead to a right regulatory decision. These 
conditions may include: 
• knowledge of the mechanisms of action of the drug supported by a 
strong biological rationale, plus the description of the patient 
population; 
• the observation of a rapid response to therapy and durable anti-tumor 
activity, that is consistent with the biological rationale; 
• a favorable safety profile, meaning the observation of grade 1-2 adverse 
events only. 
Our intuition is that it is far easier to reach an agreement on these conditions 
than, for instance, on the statistical validity of the covariate-matched (Rubin 2006) 
analysis and covariate-adjusted analysis (Tian et al. 2012) employed by the 
investigators in order to overcome the absence of controls. When it comes to 
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regulatory decisions, experts should understand the difference between “theory” and 
“practice”, that is, “between the demands of scientific understanding and those of 
practical good” (Jonsen e Toulmin 1988). 
2.6 Conclusion 
In the light of the methodological revolution driven by the discovery of tumor 
heterogeneity, we have contended the more general idea that scientific inference and 
regulatory decision-making can be reduced to sound statistical inferences and to go-
no-go choices, respectively. In detail, we have shown how the current gold standard for 
drug testing is inadequate for new oncological targeted (or personalized) treatments, 
mostly due to practical challenges such as the difficulty to enroll enough patients to 
reach a sufficient statistical power. For this reason, novel experimental designs are 
under investigation, adaptive trials being the most promising. However, regulatory 
agencies have not fully endorsed them yet because they are afraid that a lack of 
standardization could actually transform the decision-making approval into a never-
ending process. Evaluating applications for drug approval case by case can further slow 
down the process of drug development, which instead must be accelerated. With this 
regard, we proposed a third way, borrowed from bioethics, to avoid such an impasse 
while dispensing with a strict regulatory standard: the casuistry. In the casuistic 
framework, which conceptually embodies methodological pluralism, experts must 
agree not on theories behind the features of every single trial design, but only on single 
real cases. Once they found an agreement on a small set of paradigmatic cases, they can 
easily assess new ones by analogical reasoning. Finally, we proposed as a potential 
paradigmatic case the clinical development of crizotinib, a molecularly targeted drug 
for the treatment of lung cancer recently approved on the basis of two small single-arm 
early phase trials. 
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If post-genomics will fully deliver its promises, the future of clinical trials will 
necessarily be much more different. The legislator then must be prepared to rise to the 
regulatory challenge.  
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3. RULES VERSUS STANDARDS: A LEGAL-
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DRUG 
REGULATION 
“It is as if we had hardened the empirical proposition into a 
rule. And now we have, not an hypothesis that gets tested by 
experience, but a paradigm with which experience is compared and 
judged. And so a new kind of judgment” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI:22) 
3.1 Introduction 
During this last decade, philosophers of science have addressed the use of scientific 
evidence for policy-making purposes in many different ways. Such discussions have 
often adopted a Platonic stance: epistemology goes first. Given a policy-making 
problem, the philosopher should just identify which sort of evidence will better solve 
it. But the policy-making process may often be more complex. Our goal in this chapter 
is to show the limitations of this Platonic approach, advocating instead for a more 
experimental take: rather than just criticizing the evidence actually used on purely a 
priori grounds and present a principled alternative, philosophers should also care 
about the empirical benchmarks that would allow the public to see whether their 
principled alternatives work better than the already established approach. 
Our case in point is going to be drug regulation, in which for the last five decades 
RCTs have been used to test the safety and efficacy of new compounds. Philosophers of 
science have extensively criticized the epistemic superiority of clinical trials for such 
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purpose and have defended various forms of evidential pluralism, on a priori epistemic 
grounds. We are going first to restate this epistemic debate in legal terms (section 2): 
for regulatory purposes, evidential pluralism implies a standard-based decision-
making process, whereas the current approach to drug testing is based instead on rules. 
As of today, most regulatory decisions operate on a simple rule: if there are two 
positive RCTs, approve the drug. Philosophers of science contend instead that 
regulators would do better if they addressed the substantive question of whether a 
drug is safe and effective with the best evidence available. This is a standard-based 
approach. 
Legal philosophers have extensively analyzed the advantages of rules and 
standards in terms of their costs. We will discuss the cognitive and practical costs 
involved in making a regulatory decision about drug approvals, showing how much 
more costly standards are. We will then argue that good regulatory decisions are not 
just a matter of the epistemic approach implemented, but depend on the actual 
circumstances in which such decisions are taken. Whereas rules can be implemented 
without substantive discussion, standards require deliberating committees. A number 
of regulatory decisions at the FDA are actually taken by committees deliberating on a 
standard-basis. It has been shown that they are, at least, as vulnerable to conflicts of 
interest as RCT-based rules, if not more. In addition to the costs of using rules or 
standards, we should take into consideration the further costs of protecting the 
regulatory decision-making process from third-party influences. 
With all this in sight, we proceed to propose an empirical benchmark to test the 
superiority of any standard-based approach to the RCT-rule: the number of drugs 
withdrawn from the market for safety reasons under the current institutional setup of 
the FDA. We discuss the estimates available for setting this benchmark and its 
sensitivity to regulatory capture. RCT-based decisions at the FDA have reached a low 
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error rate with a reasonable degree of impartiality. In presenting an alternative, 
philosophers should discuss not just the possibility of improving upon this benchmark, 
but also the costs of achieving such an improvement. The public should decide whether 
the improvement is worth those costs. 
3.2 Rules versus standards in drug regulation 
Let us first introduce the distinction between rules and standards, following an 
extensive literature in legal and political studies. Both are legal directives with a 
conditional structure of the form “If X, then Y”. The antecedent is the “trigger”: an event 
plus some concomitant circumstances. The consequent is the “response”. Rules have a 
hard empirical trigger, and a hard determinate response. Standards have a soft 
evaluative trigger, and a soft guided response (Schlag 1985). 
“Dogs are not allowed in bars” is a rule of the form “If x is a dog, x is not allowed 
in a bar”. The trigger is an unambiguous fact (either x is a dog or not); the response is 
not open to interpretation. Rules have justifications: the reason why they were 
originally established. Preventing dogs from entering bars might have been justified in 
order to avoid disturbances to customers. According to (Schauer 1993), rules should 
be always implemented independently of their justification: seeing-eye dogs are surely 
trained not to disturb anyone in public spaces, but they are dogs nonetheless and, 
according to the rule, they should not be allowed in bars. A bear will surely be a 
disturbance in any bar, but the rule does not apply directly to bears. Rules are then 
based on an entrenched generalization: they are at once under-inclusive (the bears) and 
over-inclusive (the eye-seeing dogs). Standards are comparatively flexible: “Only good 
dogs are admitted”. The goodness of a dog should be assessed according to the 
justification of the standard. Someone should consider what may disturb customers 
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and decide whether each particular dog may behave accordingly. This is the soft 
evaluative trigger. And only then, she may allow the dog in the bar.  
There is a substantial difference between standards and rules in terms of costs. 
There are more cognitive costs to standards than to rules: these latter are simple and 
easy to apply; the former require interpretation and decision-makers should study all 
the relevant features of potential triggers, before authorizing the response. Both 
standards and rules have patient costs in case they lead to the wrong decision: in the 
case of pharmaceutical regulators, how often decisions based on either standards or 
rules grant market entrance to unsafe or ineffective drugs. Assuming a similar error 
rate for both, the more a directive is applied, the more rules are preferable to 
standards. There are less cognitive costs to rules: the comparative advantage of 
different triggers is studied and assessed only once and then implemented 
automatically. 
Following the passage of the 1962 Food and Drug Administration Act, and up 
until 2016, drug regulation in the United States has been based on a combination of 
rules and standards. The 1962 Act established that drug manufacturers had to apply to 
the FDA for the approval of new treatments. Such application would only be considered 
if: 
“[I]t includes substantial evidence consisting of adequate and 
well-controlled investigations, by experts qualified by scientific 
training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug 
involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be 
concluded that the drug will have the effect it purports or is 




The definition of a “well controlled investigation” was further clarified in 1969 
(Section 314.126 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations), when it was formally 
quantified as two randomized controlled trials plus one previous or posterior 
confirmatory trial. Clinical trials are comparative experiments in which the effects of 
an experimental drug are compared to the standard treatment or a placebo, testing the 
hypothesis that there is no difference between them according to a frequentist 
statistical design. Once the manufacturer has collected all the necessary evidence, it is 
submitted to the FDA for review in the form of a New Drug Application (NDA). 
FDA approval is then generally based on a rule: if there are two positive RCTs, 
grant market authorization. But there are also occasions to use standards. For instance, 
the reviewers might disagree on the quality of the evidence submitted. In such cases, 
the FDA may summon an advisory committee of experts to resolve the dispute (Pray 
and Robinson, 2007). Their conclusion is not mandatory for the FDA, although it is 
usually attended (Zuckerman 2006). The FDA directly appoints members of the 
advisory committee from experts in the relevant scientific fields. For example, the 
Oncologic Drug Committee consists of 13 voting members including one representative 
of patients, while the industry is represented with one non-voting member.  
Usually the FDA and the company that submitted the NDA present all the 
relevant data to the members of the committee, who should then proceed to a public 
collective deliberation. Once this is closed, each member of the committee must vote 
on some specific yes-or-no questions formulated by the FDA, such as “Given the current 
knowledge, does this medicine have a demonstrated benefit?” (Urfalino 2012). The 
FDA itself stresses the fact that it pays attention not only to the votes, but also to the 
deliberation process (Urfalino 2012). The entire process is as transparent as possible: 
the meetings of the committees are open to the public, and the minutes are then 
published on the FDA website. 
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In general, the questions for new drugs concern “whether the safety and 
effectiveness information submitted for a new drug is adequate for marketing 
approval” (Center for Durg Evaluation and Research, n.d.). The members of these 
advisory committees should thus cast their votes according to a standard: if the 
evidence presented is substantive enough, grant market approval. This is clearly a soft 
evaluative trigger, as compared to the outcome of an RCT (e.g. either it reaches 
statistical significance or not) and each voter may interpret it differently. We should 
now discuss the costs involved in both regulatory approaches. 
3.3 The cognitive costs of regulatory rules and standards 
Historically there have been different ways to assess the safety and efficacy of new 
treatments. Between 1900 and 1950 expert clinical judgment was the main approach 
in the assessment of the properties of pharmaceutical compounds, both in Britain and 
the United States. An experienced clinician would administer the drug to a series of 
patients he considered more apt to benefit from it. His conclusions would be presented 
as a case report, with the details of each patient’s reaction to the treatment. The 
alternatives were first laboratory experiments and then controlled clinical trials (from 
which RCTs would later emerge). The former would proceed either in vitro or in vivo 
(on animals and patients): considered superior by clinicians with a scientific 
background, its scope was usually restricted to safety considerations. It soon gave way 
to comparative trials, in which two treatments were alternated on the same patient or 
administered in two groups of patients (simultaneously or not). The arrangements to 
secure the comparability of the two treatments were the controls and they adopted 
different forms. The following items counted as controls in these trials: the patients’ 
eligibility criteria, the way treatments were allocated (alternation and randomization), 
uniformity in administration of treatments and patients’ blinding. They were not used 
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necessarily all at once. Statistical reports from controlled trials conveyed their results 
with different degrees of sophistication. The standardization of what we now call an 
RCT began with the British Streptomycin trial in 1947 and concluded with the adoption 
of RCTs as a regulatory yardstick by the FDA in the 1960s. RCTs articulated the 
controlled experiment with the template statistical design first advocated by Ronald A. 
Fisher (see chapter 1). 
The different methods for drug testing were all potential candidate triggers in a 
regulatory rule. As compared to these other methods, RCTs are considered superior at 
grasping causality. Regulatory agency should assess the effects of new treatments in 
terms of their safety and efficacy. Following Cartwright’s analysis, RCTs can clinch 
these effects: “if the assumptions of the study design are met, a positive result 
deductively implies that the [intervention] under test causes the outcome under 
investigation in some study members” (Cartwright and Hardie 2015). In this respect, it 
is epistemically cheap to adopt them as triggers in our regulatory rules: we have an a 
priori argument to prefer RCTs to any of the above mentioned alternatives. 
Nonetheless, we can interpret Cartwright’s analysis as an equally a priori 
argument for the inevitability of standards in drug regulation. RCTs only prove, if 
positive, that the intervention had a given effect on the particular group of patients 
under study. Pharmaceutical regulators care instead for the safety and efficacy of a 
treatment in the whole population of potential patients they should protect. According 
to Cartwright, they should not assume that causes are simply necessary and sufficient 
conditions for producing their effect, as they currently do. For Cartwright, following 
Mackie (1974), causes are instead like cakes, with their many ingredients. A short-
circuit is not a necessary and sufficient condition for a fire. There are many other 
contributing factors (the ingredients in the causal cake): e.g. the absence of sprinklers 
or the presence of oxygen. All these factors are called Insufficient but Necessary part of 
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an Unnecessary but Sufficient (INUS) conditions. A treatment effect is not just caused 
by the treatment alone, but in conjunction with a number of contributing factors. An 
RCT should ideally list (and control for) all these factors. When the treatment is applied 
outside the trial, it will only produce the same effects as long as the contributing factors 
are equally present. Physicians should assess “what the evidence has to say about the 
efficacy of an intervention for particular patients in a particular practice setting” 
(Fuller 2013).  
Regulatory authorities should not blindly apply the rule if there are two positive 
RCTs, grant market approval. For Cartwright, they should find evidence about the 
causal factors that will contribute to the efficacy of the intervention on the general 
population of patients. There is no single best method for such a causal inference that 
we could use as a trigger in a regulatory decision rule. Cartwright suggests instead 
collecting all the facts that are relevant to the transition from efficacy in the trial to 
effectiveness on the general population. For this search there is no algorithmic method, 
but rather a number of heuristics that regulators should use wisely: e.g. they can 
conduct a pre-mortem analysis, a thought experiment of the form: “If the intervention 
goes wrong, how will it have gone wrong?”. This will provide some clues as to the 
contributing factors that may spoil the effect of a treatment outside the trial. These 
heuristics cannot be synthesized in a simple rule with a hard empirical trigger. Drug 
regulation should inevitably use standards with soft evaluative triggers: if the evidence 
presented is substantive enough, grant market approval. Deciding about the 
substantiality of evidence requires the sort of deliberation carried out by the advisory 
committees at the FDA. Regulatory authorities cannot spare themselves the costs of 
deciding on a case-by-case basis what evidence is best for each given treatment. As the 
legendary FDA officer Robert Temple once put it (Berry et al. 2005), this case by case 
approach without clear decision rules was “his idea of a nightmare”. 
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3.4 The costs of impartial deliberation 
Is Temple’s regulatory nightmare worth having? Ultimately, it depends on whether the 
increased cognitive costs of standard-based decisions are compensated with a lower 
error rate. If Cartwright is right, we may expect deliberative committees to perform 
better than rule-based review boards in detecting unsafe or inefficient drugs. But we 
should be aware that deliberation per se does not seem to yield very different decisions. A 
study conducted by the National Research Center for Women & Families provides a 
quantitative analysis of the decision of FDA advisory committee (Zuckerman 2006), 
following their voting patterns. One of the most interesting findings is that committee 
members voted unanimously for 66% of the drugs they recommended for the approval, 
which is particularly surprising given that advisory committees are convened for 
controversial cases in which the available RCT evidence does not seem particularly 
persuasive. Moreover, sometimes the FDA has approved drugs for which the advisory 
committees recommended the opposite. In Zuckerman’s analysis, between 1998 and 
2005 advisory committees voted against 11 drugs, but the FDA subsequently approved 
4 (36%) of them. Whereas according to another report (Smith et al. 2012) the FDA 
decisions are very consistent with the advisory committee voting:  in a set of 63 FDA 
advisory committee meetings that included votes for or against the approval of a new 
drug between 2001 and 2010 only 2 times the FDA approved a drug despite the 
committee voting. 
According to Zuckerman “many of today’s FDA drug and device advisory 
committees are rubber stamps for approval almost every time they meet” (Zuckerman 
2006).  We have no statistics about withdrawals and warnings for committee decisions, 
but there have been significant scandals on both accounts. For example, there were 
unanimous votes for the approval of Celebrex in 1998 and Vioxx in 1999, two drugs 
that subsequently were found to significantly increase the risk of heart attack and 
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stroke. Vioxx was subsequently withdrawn, giving rise to a public scandal, while 
Celebrex remained on the market, but with strong warnings. 
In other words, despite its superior cognitive costs, standard-based deliberation 
on its own may lead to the same mistakes than rule-based approvals. There is a growing 
consensus about the problem not being in the decision method as such, be it standards 
or rules, but on the external pressure that the pharmaceutical industry imposes on 
regulatory bodies. For the industry, regulatory decisions are high-stakes bets: 
developing a drug to the point of submitting a NDA to the FDA is expensive, it does cost 
an average of $2.6 billion merely to get a drug through the FDA approval process 
(Mullard 2014).  Thereby the temptation for the industry to “capture” the regulator and 
find ways to make the FDA decide according to the industry interest, even if it collides 
with the interests of the public. Critics of the pharmaceutical industry have extensively 
shown the different ways in which both rules and standards can be flouted, getting 
drugs approved without clear evidence of their safety and efficacy. 
As to RCT based rules, there are indeed many contentious points in the design 
and conduct of trials: the list is too long to review it in full here. As of today, the sponsor 
of the trial decides about all these points and there is a large body of evidence showing 
that trials funded by industry are designed in a way that is likely to provide positive 
outcomes for the sponsor. Bero and Rennie (Bero and Rennie 1996) have discussed 
several ways in which industry-sponsored trials might favor the outcomes of a trials. 
For example, researchers could decide to use inappropriate controls. This means that 
the experimental drug might be tested against a placebo even when an efficacious 
therapy is already available, or use a dosing in the control group which favor the 
experimental drug. With regard to this, a study (Rochon et al. 1994) showed that 
almost half of industry sponsored of non-steroidal anti-inflammatory agents adopt 
arbitrary dosing which systematically favoring the experimental drugs over the 
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controls. Bias can also be introduced implementing inappropriate outcome measures. 
Surrogate endpoints are nowadays extensively used to accelerate drug development 
and save money, but their validity is questionable (Aronson 2005; Pereira, Horwitz, 
and Ioannidis 2012). Measuring an effect on a surrogate endpoint may suggest that the 
drug is very effective while it is not, or it can be found to have severe toxicity in the 
long-term. A well-known example is that of two antiarrhythmic drugs, encainide and 
flecainide which were shown “to decrease premature ventricular contractions after 
myocardial infarction” (Montaner, O’Shaughnessy, and Schechter 2001). But a later 
trial with “death” as primary endpoint found that those two drugs actually increased 
mortality (compared with placebo) (CAST Investigators 1989). So, in the end 
pharmaceutical companies sponsoring trials can make many methodological choices 
that deviate from the ideal study design for RCTs, and which a priori can favor the 
experimental drug. 
But committees are equally sensitive to pharmaceutical pressure. According to 
many FDA critics, conflicts of interest are pervasive among committee members. 
Indeed many, if not all, of the committee members have some financial ties with one or 
more pharmaceutical companies. A recent study (Pham-Kanter 2014), analyzing the 
voting pattern from 379 CDER meetings during the 15-year period 1997-2011, showed 
a strong pro-sponsor bias among the committee members who have financial 
relationships with firms. Interestingly, this pro-sponsor bias appears to be larger when 
the scientific evidence is more ambiguous, such as in all those cases in which a 
deliberative judgment would be necessary to make a good decision. 
Therefore, even if Cartwright is a priori right, and deliberative committees 
should allow us to make better regulatory decisions (with lower error rates than RCT-
based rules), in order to see such decisions emerge we need to protect the experts from 
third-party influences. Cartwright remains silent as to this problem, but other 
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philosophers have actively tackled this problem. Let us just consider two different 
approaches: Kevin Elliott (Elliott 2016) more radically suggests eradicating the very 
source of those influences, while Justin Biddle (Biddle 2007, 2013) defends instead to 
make those influences explicit in the deliberative process in order to offset them. From 
our perspective, the key point is how both approaches increase the already high costs 
of standard-based deliberation.  
According to Elliott, experts deliberating on evidence in order to make a 
standard-based decision may be most easily biased in the following circumstances 
(Elliott 2016): 
(1) Scientific findings are ambiguous or require a good deal of interpretation or are 
difficult to establish in a straightforward manner. 
(2) Individuals or institutions have strong incentives to influence those scientific 
findings in ways that damage the credibility of the research. 
(3) Individuals or institutions that have incentives to influence those scientific 
findings also have adequate opportunities to influence them.  
For Elliott, expert deliberation would be more impartial if these potential 
sources of bias were controlled for. Of course, controls of this sort have been already 
implemented with different degrees of success. Conflict of interest policies are a case 
in point: Intemann (Intemann and de Melo-Martín 2014) shows that disclosure policies 
do little to prevent or identify bias. When the bias is unconscious, disclosure policies 
will not reveal it. When the potential source of bias is acknowledged, and disclosed, 
reviewers and readers are not provided with any tools to identify the effects of those 
biases in the argument. Disclosure policies work at most as a red flag, with an 
unexpected side effect: if conflicts of interests are declared, readers tend to devaluate 
the research findings indiscriminately. 
82 
 
The cognitive costs of standards are already high (as compared to rules). 
Protecting committees from biases seems to raise these costs, as the disclosure policies 
example illustrates. And usually these cognitive costs have financial implications as 
well, although the resources available to regulatory agencies are often modest. For 
instance, funding for the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research for fiscal year 
2007 was about $500 million (Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Drug Discovery 
Development and Translation 2007) that is less than the average total cost of a large 
RCT. Moreover, about half of this budget comes from the user fees, i.e. fees payed by 
pharmaceutical companies for submitting to the FDA a New Drug Applications. 
An alternative approach to warranting the impartiality of standard-based 
decision making is to make conflicts of interest explicit and try to strike some sort of 
balance, instead of just suppressing them. Drawing on Kantrowitz (Kantrowitz 1967, 
1976) and Merton (Merton 1973), Biddle has argued for the introduction of an 
adversarial system in regulatory committees, in which the interests in conflict are 
explicitly argued for: “Two groups of advocates would present arguments for a specific 
position, and a panel of judges would adjudicate between these two groups” (Biddle 
2013). The industry chooses its own advocates, whereas the other set of advocates can 
be chosen among industry competitors (insurance companies, public health care 
agencies, patients and citizen groups). Judges of course must be scientific experts 
independent from both parties, having no direct interest or connections to the issue 
under consideration. The advocates and the judges should be, of course, kept separate. 
To control for independency, both groups of advocates should have the possibility to 
exclude a given number of scientists from the panel of judges. In this way, the decision 
should be as much impartial and objective as possible.  
Rather than investing a massive amount of resources in creating fully impartial 
committees, Biddle’s suggestion is to invest a limited amount in creating a body of 
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expert judges without conflicts of interest and let the advocates absorb the costs of 
finding the right evidence for their interpretation of the standard. We should be 
nonetheless aware of the inequality in resources between the contending parties. Most 
patients’ organizations are poor and pharmaceutical companies are their primary 
source of funding. To illustrate this, consider that in the notorious Vioxx scandal, Merck 
set up a $4.85 billion settlement fund just to resolve consumer claims, while in 2014 
the total revenues of one of the largest patient advocacy organization (the American 
Heart Association) were just 774 million (Forbes)1. 
In other words, assuming Cartwright’s arguments about the superiority of 
deliberative committees deciding upon standards, in the case of regulatory decisions, 
we should add to the cognitive costs of finding the right evidence the additional costs 
of protecting committees from third party influences. And these cognitive costs usually 
translate into more resources. When the third party is as financially powerful as the 
pharmaceutical industry, we cannot expect to obtain cheap and good standard-based 
decisions. 
3.5 An experimental approach to regulatory decision-making 
Philosophers, like Cartwright, Elliott and Biddle, advocate for reforms of our regulatory 
procedures on a priori grounds. For Cartwright, the cognitive costs of deliberating on 
standards are worth for their inferior error rate (as compared to rule-based decisions). 
Assuming the epistemic superiority of deliberative committees, Elliott and Biddle 
justify the further costs of warranting their impartiality. A priori, it is indeed plausible 
that such committees may protect patients better. But in assessing the quality of 
                                                        
1 “American Heart Association on the Forbes. The 100 Largest U.S. Charities List”. Forbes. 
Accessed October 19, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/companies/american-heart-association/ 
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regulatory bodies, we should take into account the cognitive and economic resources 
a society is willing to invest in them. 
Even if we had impartial experts with all the available evidence at hand, making 
the right decision may not be within their reach. According to Peter Gøtzsche (Gøtzsche 
2013), the clinical documentation for just three NDA can take up 70 meters of binders. 
Finding safety and efficacy issues in such a data deluge and making the right decision 
may be simply too costly, independently of whether rules or standards are used. There 
is indeed the possibility that, for the amount of resources the FDA has, patients are 
reasonably well protected with RCT-based rules. Or, at least, it is not self-evident than 
with a similar amount of resources standard-based decisions will protect patients 
better. We need to find an empirical index that allows us to judge which decision 
procedure is more suitable for protecting patients. 
Let us assume that market withdrawals are a rough indicator of the error rate 
of RCT-based rules. When drugs have serious and frequent adverse effects, the FDA will 
study whether and how the drug’s benefit and risk balance compares with treatment 
alternatives. If the risks outweigh the benefits, the drug is withdrawn from the market. 
Given that the FDA mandate is to test drugs for safety and efficacy, drug withdrawals 
are explicit regulatory mistakes. Following (Carpenter, Zucker, and Avorn 2008), there 
were only 4 safety-based withdrawals for the 216 drugs approved following the 
customary FDA procedure in between 1993 and 2004. This is a 1.9% error rate2.  Critics 
of the FDA object that these figures are artificially low. Many dangerous compounds 
remain in the market with a black box warning: a note in the drug’s label calls attention 
to serious or life-threatening risks. Following still Carpenter, there were 4 such 
warnings (1.9%) for drugs approved through the customary procedure.  
                                                        
2 Interestingly, calculating the type II error rate (safe and efficacious drugs that were incorrectly 
rejected) is out of our reach, since information about not-yet approved NDAs is considered proprietary 
under FDA regulations (Carpenter, 2014) 
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Before discussing whether these error rates are reasonable, we should wonder 
whether they are reliable at all. Had the FDA been captured by industry interests, as 
many critics contend, there would be no reason to trust these figures: the real number 
of dangerous compounds in the market would be much higher. Again, we rely on 
Carpenter for the best discussion available of this problem. Regulatory capture occurs 
when industry biases regulatory decisions according to its particular interests, even if 
these latter conflict with the public interest that the regulator should protect. Corrosive 
capture occurs when an industry pushes the regulatory process “with the aim of 
reducing costly rules and enforcement actions that reduce firm profits”, for instance, 
withdrawing drugs from pharmaceutical markets (Carpenter and Moss 2014). 
Successful corrosive capture implies that regulators do not comply with their statutory 
obligations in protecting consumers from unsafe drugs. Critics of the FDA contend that 
this is precisely what happened: 
Scientists at drug agencies are not only up against a powerful industry, they are 
also often up against their own superiors and their advisory committees who may have 
less than ideal motives for their decisions. The bosses often look the other way because 
they depend on licensing fees and political goodwill, and because questions about 
harms lead to trouble. A culture develops where many decisions are made that 
ordinary citizens would not have agreed with if they had been represented in the drug 
advisory committees 
A case in point of corrosive capture would be the 1992 Prescription Drug User 
Fee Act (PDUFA): companies were taxed for their NDA submissions in return for a 
within-deadline approval process. This clearly is in the financial interest of the 
industry: the sooner the drug is on the market, the more patent years can be 
commercially exploited. Drugs approved under the PDUFA between 1993 and 2004 
track have a higher percentage of withdrawals (7%) and black box warnings (9%), as 
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compared to standard approvals. The difference is statistically significant as compared 
to the figures above (Carpenter, Zucker, and Avorn 2008). Assuming that the public 
interest is best served by a lower error rate, there would be here a deviation. However, 
Carpenter warns about the complexity of the case. On the one hand, the public interest 
may be broader in scope: behind the PDUFA we find not just the industry, but patient 
advocacy groups requesting quicker review processes in order to have earlier access 
to drugs; and the US Senate passed it unanimously. It remains an open question what 
exact trade-off between speed and safety is acceptable for pharmaceutical consumers. 
On the other hand, capture implies that this is not an unintended shift: there should be 
a clear connection between the passage of the PDUFA and this outcome. According to 
Carpenter, advocates of the capture interpretation have failed to establish this 
connection, beyond testimonies and anecdotal evidence. It would be necessary to 
show, for instance, that officers behind the PDUFA approvals have a statistically 
significant higher rate of conflicts of interest than those behind the standard approvals. 
Otherwise, it would be difficult to rule out the alternative explanation that is the 
deadline itself, rather than the speed of approval: with well-staffed teams, there is 
evidence that approvals may be equally fast, on average, without increasing safety risks 
(Carpenter, Zucker, and Avorn 2008). Hence, the increased error rate may be an 
unintended consequence of a misguided legislation (approval deadlines) for which 
there was consensual bipartisan support (and not just industry interests). 
Summing up, following Carpenter’s analyses, our claim is that market 
withdrawals (and black box warnings) provide an empirical benchmark of how well 
the FDA can meet its regulatory mandate on a rule-based system, with its current 
institutional arrangements. Critics of the RCT-rule should discuss under which 
circumstances a standard-based system can overperform such error-rate. If the FDA 
can be persuaded to run a pilot program, perhaps we will be able to find out empirically 
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which system is better. However, as a note of caution, in drafting this pilot program, it 
will be necessary to discuss the cognitive and financial costs of the improvement: how 
much more evidence they would need and how much protection from conflicts of 
interests. The open normative question is whether a lower error-rate is going to be 
worth those resources. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The distinction between rules versus standards allows us to capture the costs at stake 
in the philosophical controversies on regulatory evidence. There are, indeed, good a 
priori arguments about the superiority of standards of evidence in the detection of 
safety and efficacy. And there are equally good a priori proposals on how to organize 
impartial committees to carry out such deliberation. Framing the decision in terms of 
the costs of implementing these ideals allows us to grasp the actual trade-off that 
regulatory authorities should make: there is only a limited amount of resources for 
them to use. It is possible that RCT-based rules have offered so far a cost-effective way 
of protecting patients, if their safety is defined in terms of market withdrawals. In any 
case, our regulatory experience provides an empirical benchmark for other 
alternatives. We suggest that, rather than further a priori discussions, we need instead 
to test these alternatives in a pilot committee. As it has often happened in the past, 
philosophy has been good at setting up ideals, but philosophers of science may find 
that reality does not live up to them – as it has happened to moral and political 
philosophers in the past. 
Our analysis is grounded in a simple and obvious fact: generally speaking, drugs 
always come with some sort of side effects, which eventually can harm the consumers. 
That is why the assessment of drug safety is a matter of a risk-benefit analysis. 
However, some critics of pharmaceutical system (e.g. Vandenbroucke 2004, Osimani 
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2014; Stegenga 2016) hold that since current standard methodologies – namely, RCTs 
– systematically underestimate harms, then any benefit-analysis would be biased. For 
example, according to Stegenga (2016) clinical research does not reliably measure the 
harms of drugs because every phase of trials suffers from different bias: publication 
bias, sensitivity issues, evidence shrouded in secrecy, etc. Also, clinical research would 
be biased upstream by the way harms are defined and measured. Vandenbroucke 
(2004, 2008) for its part, endorses the adoption of different methodological standards 
to better capture harms on the basis of a priori epistemological considerations. The 
“hierarchy of evidence” should be reversed when we are interested in finding 
unintended events. From a methodological point of view, 
observational/epidemiological studies would not suffer from selection bias: “Even if 
the doctor knows whom s/he is prescribing the treatment to, treatment allocation is 
masked with respect to unintended effects, given that s/he does not know them” 
(Osimani 2014). From an epistemological point of view, with respect to adverse effects, 
we aim to discover harms rather than test a hypothesis of efficacy (or safety). And in 
the context of discovery, other methodologies, such as case reports, can provide more 
convincing evidence than RCTs. These criticisms have two main implications for our 
discussion.  
First, drugs withdrawals for safety reasons would be a good empirical 
benchmark only if they were based on evidence coming from sources different than 
RCTs. This is exactly the case, at least according to a recent systematic review on 
worldwide withdrawal of medical products because of adverse drug reactions 
(Onakpoya, Heneghan, and Aronson 2016). As a matter of fact, case reports are cited as 
evidence in 30 out of 40 withdrawals. Moreover, the entire surveillance system looks 
quite efficient, considering that the median interval between the first report of an 
adverse event and the withdrawal of the correspondent drug is 1 year, and the time it 
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takes for drugs to be withdrawn is shortening over years. Also, the risk-benefit is 
assessed on an orthodox interpretation of the precautionary principle, when the 
evidence is in doubt withdrawal is more likely, especially when dramatic effects (e.g. 
deaths) are reported.  
Secondly, since standard definitions of harms are too under-inclusive we cannot 
have a reliable estimate of the safety of any drug. It is true that RCTs are not designed 
to capture all the potential harms of a drug. According to Gøtzsche (2013), for instance, 
drugs are usually tested in a different population than the one who will actually take 
them in the real world. For example, the largest consumers are elderly, who are 
systematically excluded from clinical trials. Furthermore, elderly people are usually in 
treatment with several drugs, and we know very little about polypharmacy. But an 
ideal system collecting all the potential evidence about the safety of a drug is likely 
outside the resources of regulators. Anyway, the additional cognitive and financial 
costs should be discussed in connection with the real benefits for the patients. As we 
stated above, the open question is whether such an ideal system is really worth it. 
With regard to this, the last point we want to make is that benefit-risk analysis 
should not be assessed prima facie from a public health perspective and it is not only a 
matter of quantifying the adverse effects of a drug. The idea is that knowing in advance 
all the harms (assuming that this is feasible) would not impact much at the level of 
individual patients. Ultimately, protecting patients depends more on the prescribing 
physicians and the risk-benefit balance for the individuals rather than on the detection 
of harms at the population level. But that analysis also depends on the amount of risk 
that one person is willing to accept, and the variability of risk-aversion is very high 
among individuals. According to Edwards (Edwards 2005) there are very few drugs in 
which the overall risk really is greater than the effectiveness. Thus, when a drug is 
taken off the market, all the patients who were taking the drugs without any adverse 
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effects are going to suffer. Therefore, Edwards suggests focusing more on how patients 
are actually treated rather than whether a drug is on the market or not. Patients should 
be asked what risks they are prepared to take and for what benefits. From the 
individual perspective Vioxx scandal is not such a big failure of drug regulation itself. 
In the debate, patients who needed Vioxx (or any COX 2 inhibitors) have been left 
without any alternative: some of them have had only a disadvantage from Vioxx 
withdrawal. Therefore, a more reliable benefit-risk analysis would require much more 
useful information coming from different studies addressing different safety and 
efficacy questions, such as for instance a comparison between Vioxx and older NSAIDs. 
And yet the usefulness of information is hardly identifiable a priori. 
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4. DRUG REGULATION AND EVIDENTIARY 
PLURALISM 
“If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as 
doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty” 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty) 
4.1 Introduction 
In early December 2016, the Congress of the United States passed the 21st Century 
Cures Act (21CCA), the biggest health reform legislation since Obamacare. The bill is 
vast, ranging from provisions related to the funding and administration of the National 
Institute of Health, to new rules for informed consent, clinical data sharing, and 
patients’ privacy. The sections aimed at getting new drugs and medical devices 
approved more easily and quickly has been the most controversial so far. The 21CCA 
(Public Law 114-255) introduces a more flexible drug approval process, with less 
demanding requirements for certain drugs and new evidentiary standards as an 
alternative to the expensive and time-consuming RCTs. For instance, in order to 
support the approval of certain drugs for new indications, the 21CCA allows 
pharmaceutical companies to provide “data summaries” and “real world evidence” (e.g. 
observational studies), instead of RCT data (Sec. 3022). Moreover, the law gives more 
flexibility to the FDA to grant accelerated approval to new drugs for life-threating 
conditions or unmet medical needs, on the basis of early-phase clinical trials, trials 
measuring efficacy and safety on surrogate outcomes alone, or trials adopting 
heterodox experimental designs (Sec. 3021). Critics of the 21CCA argue that the new 
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legislation is a “gift” to pharmaceutical companies, its most active promoters, with a 
large amount of expenses in lobbying activities1. In particular, critics feel that shifting 
away from RCTs will open the door to harmful or ineffective treatments. In the end, 
patients will suffer the consequences. Nonetheless, patients’ advocacy groups actively 
supported the 21CCA, mainly because it promises faster market access to new 
treatments (Avorn and Kesselheim 2015; Zuckerman, Jury, and Silcox 2015). 
The case of solanezumab illustrates the dilemma. While the 21CCA was under 
discussion at the US Senate, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rejected 
solanezumab, a drug for Alzheimer keenly awaited by many patients, since it showed 
promising results in early phase trials. Yet, it turned out to be no better than a placebo 
in standard RCTs. Kesselheim and Avorn speculate on what might have happened if a 
more flexible evidentiary standard had been already in place. Since there are no 
working treatments for Alzheimer, early phase trials suggesting benefit for patients 
with Alzheimer’s disease would have “been enough to support FDA approval — 
particularly since no major safety concerns had been raised in those trials” (Kesselheim 
and Avorn 2017). As Kesselheim puts it, the 21CCA changes in the approval process 
“are based on the foundational misconceptions that the FDA standards for approval are 
too demanding and thus keep valuable new treatments from the US public and 
needlessly increase the cost and duration of drug and device development. In this 
respect, the law is a solution to a problem that mostly does not exist” (ibi). And yet, 
according to a letter from a US senator, the FDA is staring at about 4,000 new drug 
applications that have yet to be approved. 
                                                        
1 The 21st Century Cures Act is one of the most lobbied bill of legislation in recent history. According to 
the Center for Responsive Politics, more than 1,455 lobbyists representing 400 companies have made 
their case for, or against, the law. Data on lobbying activities are free available at 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/billsum.php?id=hr6-114. Accessed 19, October 2017. 
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According to its critics, the problem with the 21CCA is that it introduces not just 
a double, but a multiplicity of evidentiary standards for new regulatory approvals: 
whereas treatments undergoing the traditional testing process (conventional RCTs) 
stick to the old pre-21CCA standards of safety and efficacy, those other treatments 
(successfully) tested with new methods will bring into the market potentially different 
thresholds of safety and efficacy. Patients may end up suffering the consequences if 
these new methods fail. In this chapter, we want to argue that the multiplicity of testing 
standards is more defensible than critics think. As a matter of fact, since 1962 we 
already have a variety of standards for testing the safety and the efficacy of medical 
treatments, and the system has worked reasonably well so far (see chapter 3). As we 
will argue in section two, medical treatments (not just drugs) have different testing 
standards, according to the potential public health risks they pose. Drug regulation has 
developed, throughout the 20th century in reaction to public health catastrophes 
caused by all sorts of medical interventions.  
Although we lack a principled agreement on what constitutes one such public 
catastrophe (e.g. how many victims? What age? Etc), the pre-21CCA regulatory 
schemes are grounded on an implicit consensus on the risks involved by different 
medical interventions: the bigger the threat, the stricter the testing standards. We shall 
illustrate it in sections 3 and 4 with the cases of surgery and medical devices. In section 
5, we will present a concept of risk that, in our view, captures our current regulatory 
consensus. Risks depend on two factors: the hazards involved in a treatment and the 
number of people potentially exposed to it. Again, we lack a principled definition of 
both factors, but our current regulation has consensual enough approximations to both 
of them. From a political standpoint, this concept of risk is all we need to justify the 
existence of multiple testing standards and if it has worked well so far, there is no 
reason to expect its collapse with the 21CCA. Consequently, different testing standards 
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are defensible for certain class of drugs (e.g. targeted therapies). To conclude, in section 
6, we will address a potential crucial objection to our argument: that any a priori 
assessment of risks always comes with an unacceptable degree of uncertainty, 
therefore we should always demand for stricter testing standards. 
4.2 What the FDA does: the pervasiveness of double standards 
Since the 1962 FDA Act, pharmaceutical regulatory agencies all over the world have 
required evidence of safety and efficacy before granting market approval. The United 
States FDA is the largest and the most influential of all of these agencies: it monitors a 
market of products worth over 1 trillion dollars, which represent nearly a fourth of 
consumers’ spending2. With respect to medical products regulation, the FDA is 
generally considered a successful agency as far as we consider drug withdrawals as a 
reliable empirical benchmark. For instance, between 1993 and 2006 only a mean of 1.5 
drugs per year have been withdrawn, and the number of withdrawals has not increased 
over time (Issa et al. 2007), moreover the agency performed well in protecting patients 
from some big failure (see Sacks, Avorn, and Kesselheim 2017). 
The first point in our argument is that, well before the 21CCA, the FDA already 
operated under a multiple testing standard regimen3. The FDA classifies the medical 
products it regulates under three main categories according to their “nature”, each of 
them provided with its own testing standard.  If the product is a technological 
manufacture, it is considered a medical device; if the product is composed of biological 
compounds (sugar, proteins, nucleic acids, etc.), it is a biologic; finally, if the product is 
chemically synthesized, it falls on the category of drugs. Regulatory guidelines vary 
between the three categories. Drugs are tested through rigid controlled trials, while 
                                                        
2 See https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm553038.htm. Accessed 19, October 
2017. 
3 See Title 21 Code of Federal Regulations (21CFR) Parts 800 – 1299. 
98 
 
medical devices and biologics testing standards differ according to whether they are 
intended as treatments or not, ranging from basic manufacturing control to RCTs. 
Why this classification and the different testing regimes? Intuitively it should be 
based on the different “nature” of the tested treatments, but this is less obvious than it 
may seem. Some products now defined as medical devices were previously classified 
as drugs. Biologics can be defined either as drugs or devices and therefore they are also 
subject to different regulations. Stem cells therapy is a non-trivial example, in 2006 the 
FDA extended its regulatory power over cell therapies, which before were considered 
as part of medical practice (as a common procedure of transplantation) and therefore 
not subject to any regulatory burden.  
If the different testing regimes are not clearly grounded on the nature of the 
treatment examined, how can it be justified? The goal of the FDA is to protect 
consumers from harms (dangerous treatments) and scams (fake treatments) and yet, 
depending on the treatment, the FDA may apply different methods with potentially 
different consequences (just as critics of the 21CCA fear today). Of course, there is a 
clear difference in scientific rigor between RCTs and basic control of manufacturing: 
clinical trials are more severe than any other testing standard. Although, intuitively for 
some medical devices, biologics and drugs can have the same potential bad 
consequences for patients. That is precisely the reason why the FDA extended its 
control over stem-cells therapies (Freeman and Fuerst 2012), considering them as 
drugs and therefore assigning them to most rigid standards of testing: without any 
control, they can have terrible consequences, also considering that in theory they might 
be employed for a wide range of conditions. At the same time, other medical products 
(devices or biologics) seem to be less harmful for patients, or harboring different risks: 
rubber gloves if good-manufactured will hardly harm patients. Indeed, historically 
there have been medical catastrophes in pharmacology, but not so much elsewhere. 
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The FDA can wield its authority according to the potential risks involved in medical 
products. As well, the choice of testing standards (and of consequently regulatory 
burden) varies according to the risks. The two following sections will better illustrate 
this point.  
4.3 What the FDA does not: the case of surgery 
The existence of a double standard in testing medical treatments has been detected, 
debated and criticized (Deyo 2004), as we will now illustrate with the case of surgery. 
As we will show, there are epistemic and political reasons against the conduct of RCTs 
in surgery, but in our view only the latter explain the existence of a double standard for 
surgical treatments, and a very poor one at that. But this is a test case for our claim as 
well: it is not just that there have been political arguments for not regulating surgical 
procedures, there has been no positive reason to do it either. Our societies are 
apparently willing to live with the level of risks involved by our testing standards in 
surgery.  
Let us review the arguments against conducting RCTs in surgery. First of all, on 
the epistemic side, some key features of RCTs cannot be easily implemented in surgical 
trials. Blinding and placebos are particularly difficult: surgeons cannot be blinded in 
any way, whereas the adoption of sham procedures as controls raise difficult ethical 
issues. Without proper blinding, biases can contaminate the trial outcome making the 
experiment scientifically useless. Patients are also reluctant to undergo treatment 
randomization in surgery. The procedures under test are often perceived as highly 
unequal, regarding the invasiveness of the intervention, side effects, or quality of life. 
Hence patient enrollment becomes difficult, making trials difficult to complete for lack 
of a proper sample size. 
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Surgical treatments are often difficult to standardize as RCTs require. Surgical 
interventions are complex and heavily skill-dependent procedures, subject to 
improvements in technical performance. Quality in performance requires extensive 
training over time – a “learning curve”, which is difficult to control in a clinical trial. 
During the learning curve phase, errors may likely occur, and this could greatly distort 
the outcome results.  
Difficult as these problems may be, there are alternative approaches that would 
make surgical trials feasible (Lilford et al. 2004; McCulloch et al. 2002). For instance, 
control techniques such as audit data collection or continuous third-party monitoring, 
may be included into the trial design to mitigate the lack of blinding and randomization. 
Learning curves and variation in technique can be measured and controlled as well 
(Farrokhyar et al. 2010). Also, according to the least optimistic review (Solomon and 
McLeod 1995) in the ideal situation RCTs can be performed to evaluate 40% of 
treatment questions involving surgical procedures – and the authors consider it a 
conservative estimate.  
On the political side, there are two major obstacles for the conduct of surgical 
trials. On the one hand, there is the funding issue: RCTs are very expensive experiments 
and, unlike with pharmacological treatments, there is no clear sponsor for surgical 
tests. Publicly funded surgical trials are not a priority for any political party, as of today. 
On the other hand, surgical interventions are considered, at least in the US, a medical 
practice, outside the scope of any dedicated regulatory body: the FDA can only examine 
products, not services. In the 1960s and 1970s, the US medical profession resisted State 
intervention on medical practice (e.g. prescription) as a form of communism (see 
Tobbell 2011). For the same reasons, the FDA do not regulate behavioral and 
psychological interventions, nor off-label use of drugs. 
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In our view, the double standard in surgery owes more to politics than to 
method. The current testing procedure, on its own, seems difficult to defend: surgical 
treatments are regularly applied without any experimental testing, relying mostly on 
experts’ judgment, anecdotal evidence, or case series. And these assessments often fail 
and surgical interventions are rarely riskless: as an example, extracranial-intracranial 
vascular bypass to reduce the risk of ischemic stroke has been widely performed based 
on a single case report. In 1985, however, a randomized trial demonstrated that 
extracranial-intracranial bypass actually increased the risk of fatal and nonfatal stroke 
compared to medical therapy alone, and the procedure has been abandoned ever since 
(The EC/IC Bypass Study 1985). Even if a double standard is inevitable, there is room 
for improvement in surgery (e.g. Tonelli, Benditt, and Albert 1996). Indeed, we may 
wonder why it is that so systematic attempt at reforming surgical testing has taken 
place.  
Despite the prestige of the surgical profession, it is hard to believe that the 
community of surgeons is powerful enough to resist the external imposition of testing 
standards, when the omnipotent pharmaceutical companies are so heavily regulated. 
Here is our claim: if pharmaceutical regulation has been driven by a series of 
pharmacological catastrophes, there has been no comparable crisis in surgery to 
prompt regulators to act. The adoption of some inefficient and unsafe surgical 
procedures did not harm enough people neither to make regulators to demand for a 
special control over surgical treatments, nor for the politics to feel the necessity to 
invest resources to guard public health. 
Medical catastrophes are unlikely to happen in surgery, that is mostly because 
of contingent reasons: new surgical techniques are usually successive adaptations of 
existing techniques lead to the emergence of new procedures that are not radical 
innovations produced by a specific research program, but part of a continuum formed 
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by the evolution of day-today practices (Frader and Caniano 1998). Occasionally new 
procedures arise in dramatic circumstances when surgeons, often in an emergency, 
decide to try a new approach even though there is no adequate statistical support for 
its efficacy. If they are successful, their techniques may subsequently form the basis of 
new protocols and be routinely applied (Petrini 2013). As soon as something goes 
wrong surgeons can easily dismiss a procedure, this means that in case of failure very 
few patients will suffer.  
Societies seem to tolerate the risks associated with surgical procedures, leaving 
them unregulated. They do not seem a threat for public health, hence it is not worth to 
invest financial and cognitive resources to regulate them. As we are going to see in the 
next paragraph, the tolerance of certain risks associated with medical treatments is 
even clearer in medical device regulation. 
4.4 The lessons from medical devices regulation 
The regulation of medical devices provides additional evidence for our claim: 
regulators react to catastrophes alerting of the risks involved in certain treatments. 
And, as we are going to see, an a priori assessment of the potential risks of a treatment 
dictates the necessary level of testing. 
The Thalidomide of medical devices' arena was the Dalkon Shield, an 
intrauterine contraceptive device marketed in 1971 by the A.H. Robins pharmaceutical 
company. With a massive advertising campaign, promising perfect birth control 
protection with virtually no adverse effects, it was a resounding success –the feared 
long terms side effects of contraceptive pills played a role here. Dalkon Shield was 
prescribed to more than 2 million women in the U.S, 10% of the market for 
contraceptives. In its three years on the market it caused more than 200.000 serious 
pelvic infections, leading to further adverse events ranging from infertility to death. In 
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the aftermath of the scandal, the Congress passed the landmark Medical Device 
Amendments (MDA) to the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), requiring 
extensive testing and formal regulatory approval before medical devices can reach the 
market. 
The way the FDA handled this new mandate is equally illustrating for our claim. 
In 1976 the FDA suddenly had to sift through a huge volume of “medical products” 
falling under its jurisdiction. With scarce resources, the FDA had to prioritize its efforts.  
The FDA decided then to assign categories of risk associated with the devices, 
grounding on background knowledge and common sense. Intuitively, some medical 
products seem less risky than others: for instance, latex gloves naturally carry less risk 
than cardiac pacemakers, even if both count as devices for regulatory purposes. Hence, 
the agency created three different device classes, according to the hazards they pose to 
the patients, each class with its own testing standards. According to section 513(a)(1) 
of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. 360c(a)(1)), the three device classes are defined as follows: 
• Class I: Devices are subject to a comprehensive set of regulatory 
authorities called general controls that are applicable to all classes of devices. 
• Class II: Devices for which general controls, by themselves, are 
insufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the 
device, and for which there is sufficient information to establish special controls to 
provide such assurance. 
• Class III: Devices for which general controls, by themselves, are 
insufficient and for which there is insufficient information to establish special controls 
to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device. Class III 
devices typically require premarket approval.  
Class I devices are considered low-risk and do not undergo any regulatory 
review, they are subject only to control for good manufacturing practices. Class II 
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devices instead are believed to be moderate-risk, so they are subjected to a review 
procedure known as “510k” (from the section Section 510(k) of the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act). In a 510k submission, the FDA establishes that a device is safe and 
effective if the manufacturer demonstrates that the new device is “substantially 
equivalent” either to an existing device already approved through the same process or 
to a device which has been on the market before the 1976 federal law was passed. 
These reference devices are named “predicate devices”. Class III devices instead are 
high-risk, and/or have novel intended uses, and hence require direct demonstration of 
safety and efficacy through a process very similar to a New Drug Application (NDA): 
sponsor must submit valid scientific evidence of safety and efficacy. However, the 
standard of evidence is substantially lower for medical devices than for drugs.  
While for drugs the FDA required “substantial evidence of safety and efficacy”, 
specified in two positive RCTs, for medical devices it requires only “reasonable 
assurance of safety and efficacy” (Ciani, Tarricone, and Taylor 2016). This means, in 
practice, one single controlled study, but the regulation permits also “reliance upon 
other valid evidence […] even in the absence of well-controlled investigations” (ibi.). 
Thus, the evidence that would be never sufficient to grant market access to a drug can 
actually result in the approval of a medical device, maybe even to treat the same 
condition. 
The regulation of medical devices makes the multiplicity of evidentiary 
standards clear and reasonable. Moreover, it makes clear that the reason why we 
regulate medical treatments is mostly political, rather than epistemic. We want to 
minimize the likelihood of a medical catastrophe to happen. As it happened with 
pharmaceutical regulation, a scandal (Dalkon Shield) makes necessary a political 
control over the devices, but intuitively testing low-risk ones like rubber gloves in a 
clinical trial does not sound a very good idea.  The political assessment of potential 
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risks associated with devices dictates the choice of mandatory testing standards of 
safety and efficacy to grant market approval. This political assessment of risk is purely 
informal, but it seems enough to justify the existence of multiple standards of testing. 
However, this political consensus on the acceptable levels of risk depends on a 
particular conception of it. As we are going to see in the next paragraph, the risk 
regulators care about can be defined as the likelihood of a treatment of producing a 
medical catastrophe. 
4.5 Classifying risks: hazards and exposure 
It seems as if the existence of a multiple testing standard for medical treatments has 
been socially admissible well before the 21CCA. The admissibility of these various 
standards depends on the perceived risks involved in each treatment. Politically 
speaking, this is all our societies demand from our regulatory bodies: stricter testing 
regimes are, of course, conceivable and defensible (Stegenga 2016; Osimani 2013), but 
the forty years of regulatory experience between 1962 and 2017 suggest that there is 
nothing wrong per se with a multiplicity of testing standards. Key to this approach is, 
of course, the correct assessment of the risk involved, and the history of medical device 
regulation shows that these assessments sometimes fail. In order to defend a risk-
based multiplicity of standards, we need to justify the way the risk assessment is 
carried out.  
Over the last years, indeed, some high profile regulatory failures have raised 
concerns about the evaluation of medical devices (Ciani, Tarricone, and Taylor 2016; 
Ciani, Federici, and Pecchia 2018; Hines et al. 2010; Zuckerman, Brown, and Nissen 
2011). For instance, in 2012, thousands of silicone-gel based breast have been 
withdrawn from the market following many cases of leaks of silicone inside patients’ 
body (Horton 2012). In 2010, an artificial hip implant (ASR XL Acetabular System) was 
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recalled after it became clear that “the device failed at the astonishing rate of at least 
one in eight […]. 21% of these hips have had to be replaced by 4 years after 
implantation, and the revision rate rises to 49% at 6 years, as compared with 12 to 15% 
at 5 years for other devices” (Curfman and Redberg 2011). In both cases the devices, 
considered moderate-risk, entered the market after approval under the 510k process.   
In order to understand, and justify, the way regulatory risks are assessed, we 
suggest adopting a common distinction in the field of chemical management between 
hazards and risks (van Leeuwen e Vermeire 2007). The term “hazard” refers to the 
intrinsic properties of a chemical, and its likelihood to do harm. While, the risk is the 
combination of hazard and exposure (R=H*E). The risk is what you want to mitigate by 
changing either or both components, hazard and exposure. In purely mathematical 
terms: if one of them is zero, the risk is also zero. Then, for instance, with regard to low 
risk medical devices, they harbor a hazard near to zero, therefore the assessment of the 
risk after the exposure is close to zero as well. This means that they will hardly produce 
a catastrophe in terms of harms, which is why they are assigned to a lower testing 
standard. This distinction would allow us to explain also why the FDA does not regulate 
surgical treatments even though intuitively they harbor much more hazards than latex 
gloves or than an ordinary drug for colds. However, surgical treatments are not 
administered in the same way of drugs. When a new drug is released on the market, it 
becomes immediately available for thousands of patients, whereas new surgical 
procedures are administered to individual patients sequentially. As soon as something 
goes wrong the surgical procedures can be dismissed, thus the procedure can be 
extremely harmful, but it eventually harms only few patients. Paradoxically, a 
dangerous surgical procedure might harm more patients in RCTs than in the real world.  
Therefore, from a public health perspective, surgical procedures are not much more 
worrisome for regulators than rubber gloves: calling back the equation R=H*E, since 
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the exposure is very low the risk is as low as well. Whereas, when both the hazards and 
the exposure are more than zero then it is necessary to assess the risk trough some 
experimental procedures which can furnish a better estimate of the level of safety of 
treatments. 
The point of introducing the risk vs. hazard distinction is to make explicit the 
two major factors behind regulatory risk assessment in medicine. Regulatory bodies 
like the FDA do not care about hazards per se, but in combination with exposure. 
Regulatory agencies do not have the resources to provide a uniform level of protection 
for patients whenever there is the possibility of hazards. In allocating testing resources, 
agencies weight hazards by exposure, although not always in a purely quantitative 
manner4. We will not defend this approach from a normative standpoint, for which 
there would be many different arguments (e.g. in utilitarian terms: the greatest good 
for the majority of patients) and objections. For the sake of the argument, it is enough 
to defend its empirical adequacy: the risk vs. hazard distinction allow us to grasp the 
political consensus about treatment testing. We want stricter tests where the risks are 
bigger, and we do not care so much about hazards if the exposure is low. From this 
standpoint, the multiplicity of testing standards is politically defensible: there seems 
to be a broad agreement in the US (and in those countries which imitate its regulatory 
system) about calibrating our testing standards according to this particular concept of 
risk.  
Of course, it is open to debate how to articulate and refine the concepts of hazard 
and exposure. Hazards do not come in a single flavor, instead they exhibit qualitative 
differences. Death, for instance, is far superior to any other potential adverse events 
                                                        
4 E.g. sulfanilamide was an antibacterial compound to treat streptococcal infection that, in the late 1930s, 
was marketed in a toxic solution that caused more than 100 deaths in the United States. The supporters 
of granting stronger powers to the FDA framed the scandal in terms of the group of most likeable victims: 
white, virginal kids avoiding any mention of the black, male, and possibly sexually licentious consumers 
of sulfanilamide (Carpenter 2010). 
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(e.g inflammation). Most often, hazards cannot be measured on a unidimensional scale 
and the exercise of value judgment becomes central. But this does not mean that 
hazards are incommensurable. We have a consensus on what we take as a hazard, and 
it depends on the outcome associated with that. Take for instance the definition of 
serious adverse events that the FDA implements for market withdrawal, or black box 
warning. An adverse event is any undesirable experience associated with the use of a 
medical product in a patient. The event is considered to be serious and should be 
reported to the FDA when the patient outcome is among some of the following: death, 
life-threatening condition, hospitalization, disability or permanent damage, congenital 
anomaly or birth defect, intervention to prevent permanent impairment. 
As to the exposure5, we are referring to the number of individuals who can 
potentially enter in contact with a medical product, that is the target population. Since 
its birth the FDA has regulated medical drugs recognizing the differences between risks 
associated with the practice of medicine, which are individual, and risks associated 
with the mass production of drugs, which are public. As it were, the FDA had always 
taken into account consideration about exposure, leaving almost unregulated the 
product or practices with low individual risks while regulating medical products that 
carry with them risks associated with mass production. As to pharmaceuticals, in 1962, 
we had undifferentiated populations of pharmaceutical consumers, but we have been 
refining the target decade after decade. For instance, today our understanding of 
cancer biology is solid enough to define patients according to the genomic profile of the 
tumor, rather than its site of occurrence. Using genome sequencing in clinical setting, 
we can identify previously occult biomarkers of drug sensitivity that can aid in the 
identification of patients most likely to respond to targeted anticancer drugs. This 
                                                        
5 Here we are using the term exposure in a more intuitive rather than technical sense. In the medical 
field it is defined as the amount of a factor (a variable of interests) to which a group or individual was 
exposed, and it usually captures the temporal aspect (see Velentgas et al. 2013). 
109 
 
makes possible to have target population of hundreds of patients, or even less. 
Therefore, for this class of drugs the likelihood of a medical scandal is lower than for 
an ordinary drug, perhaps comparable to medical devices or surgical treatments6.  
As Iyer and collegues demonstrated in their landmark study on everolimus (Iyer 
et al. 2012), some drugs that might fail in RCTs are actually effective in cancer patients 
harboring a specific – but rare – somatic mutation. Now the 21CCA opens up the 
possibility of drug approval for genetically defined groups. For instance, it allows the 
use of Real World Evidence (RWE) to support a new drug application or a label change. 
Thus, as of today there is not yet a clear consensus on how real-world evidence should 
be used, and how it can impact on the approval process. According to some 
commentators (Sherman et al. 2016), intuitively, collection of RWE is impossible 
before the approval of a drug. By contrast, we think that collection of RWE is actually 
feasible. For example, it could be accomplished allowing access to investigational drugs 
to all the patients who may benefit from them but who do not meet the entry criteria 
in the clinical trials. This access may be launched for therapies targeting small 
populations of patients in parallel with phase II trials, hence right after the assessment 
of the minimum requirements of safety. This program would help investigators to 
address one major issue in the drug approval process. Rather than running expensive, 
time consuming, and challenging RCTs, collection of RWE can provide more and faster 
information about the safety and efficacy of new therapies.  
                                                        
6 From an epistemic point of view, this approach rehabilitates the role of mechanisms in assessing drug 
safety and efficacy, which has been instead minimized by many EBM scholars, yet strenuously 
defended by as many philosophers of science (Clarke et al. 2013). Indeed, the a priori risk-based 
classification heavily depends on the mechanistic knowledge, both for assessing the hazards and for 
defining the target population. It is not that the knowledge of mechanisms of action of a medical 
treatment is necessary to grant an approval, or to easing the testing standards, but it is necessary to 
assess the likelihood of a drug of producing a medical scandal and therefore to driving the choice of the 




From a political standpoint, multiple standards of drug testing are acceptable to 
the extent that we have an agreement on the levels of tolerable risks, and we have 
indeed the basis of such agreements in our current regulation. Our conceptualization 
of risks makes more explicit the basis of this consensus. It seems reasonable to 
associate different testing standards to medical products according to their likelihood 
of producing a medical scandal. We should not let fears based on pharmaceutical 
catastrophes that happened more than 50 years ago stop us from improving our drug 
regulatory system.  
4.6 The costs of uncertainty 
Of course, there is always a degree of uncertainty around every medical treatment. 
With regards to this, both surgical interventions and medical devices makes no 
exception, let alone pharmaceutical treatments. Therefore, one potential objection to 
the risk-based choice of testing standards is that we should always run the most 
stringent test in order to reduce our uncertainty around the real risks and benefits of 
any medical treatment. From this perspective, the adoption of different evidentiary 
standard for surgery, medical devices, or drug, is not justifiable. This idea however is 
entrenched in the more general view – epistemically defensible - whereby uncertainty 
is unacceptable when coming to risks and medical regulatory decisions, and RCTs are 
the best and the only way to reduce it.  
Let us then focus on uncertainty. First of all, it is a very different concept from 
risk. With regard to regulatory decisions, sometimes we have a tendency to think that 
they are linked, the more the uncertainty the more the risks for patients, but it is not 
the case. In fact, a drug can be safe and effective even though we have no clue about it. 
It might sound trivial, but the risks are independent from the results of any experiment. 
Second, as well as we rarely have a complete knowledge of mechanisms, we hardly 
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have a complete statistical knowledge. For instance, it is largely acknowledged that 
efficacy and safety data obtained in “artificial” setting, such as RCTs, are not necessarily 
a good predictor of the effects on the real-world environment of clinical use 
(Cartwright 2010). Therefore, given the gaps in our knowledge, all regulatory decisions 
regarding whether to license a drug or not are taken under a condition of uncertainty.  
The level of acceptable uncertainty around benefits and risks is debatable 
(Eichler et al. 2013; Moore and Furberg 2012). What is sometimes overlooked in the 
current epistemological debate about evidentiary standards in drug regulation is the 
unfortunate fact that in a resources-constrained environment, every piece of additional 
information comes at an opportunity cost (Beckman, Clark, and Chen 2011). The 
concept of “opportunity costs” can be easier if illustrated by means of an example. 
Consider the detection of a clinically relevant, but very rare, adverse effect of a drug, 
such as carcinogenicity. Being the adverse effect very rare, to tell apart if it is a relevant 
signal or a by-chance product, it is necessary to run clinical trials that would involve 
tens of thousands of patients. Therefore, this trial would surely reduce our uncertainty 
about the drug safety, but it would require a large investment for a result that would 
add little to the regulatory decision. That is, because the risk is so small the benefits 
may still outweigh this risk. Very often, increasing amounts of investment or effort in 
clinical research produce very little small gains in knowledge. A more concrete example 
of the potential opportunity costs of drug regulation is provided by Bouvy and 
colleagues (Bouvy et al. 2012). In this study, the authors assess “the cost-effectiveness 
of the International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) E14 guideline that requires a 
thorough QT/QTc (TQT) study for all drugs under development”.  Prolongation of the 
QT interval in the surface electrocardiogram (ECG), which could result in potentially 
fatal ventricular tachyarrhythmias, was a leading cause for drug withdrawals during 
1988–2000 (Shah 2006). This is why in 2005, the International Conference on 
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Harmonisation (ICH) promulgated a guideline (ICH E14) calling for a “thorough 
QT/QTc” (TQT) study for all new drugs before approval. ICH E14 guideline has been 
adopted by the US Food and Drug Administration, as well by the European Medicines 
Agency. But this has led to an increase of the costs involved in clinical trials. The 
authors then compared the costs of regulation compared to non-regulation (that is 
clinical trials without costs of TQT studied and ECG monitoring). They conclude that 
ICH E14 costs society €187,000 to gain one QALY (quality-adjusted life year) and €2.4 
million to prevent one drug-induced sudden cardiac death. This study highlights the 
need to determine acceptable levels of risks related to the use of drugs and acceptable 
cost-effectiveness of safety-related regulatory actions.  
The bottom line is that when we discuss the level of uncertainty, we should be 
aware of the costs involved in any attempt to reduce it, therefore in the choice and 
development of evidentiary standard. It has been always pointed out – with good 
reason – that drug regulatory decisions must be separated from the economic 
considerations. However, given the recent controversy and concerns about the prices 
of new drugs, many are starting to realize that regulatory authorities cannot ignore 
anymore the cost implications of their licensing requirements, because those costs will 
ultimately be passed on to consumers. As Bouvy and his coauthors put it, “in a world of 
rising health-care expenditures and increasing drug development costs, regulatory 
agencies and society at large should think carefully about what they are willing to pay 
for reassurance with respect to drug safety. This is particularly relevant if determining 
these risks does not ultimately translate into substantial health gains, or when health 
gains can be achieved only by spending vast amounts of money” (Bouvy et al. 2012). 
In addition, we should also consider non-financial costs, which instead impinge 
exclusively on patients: the costs of withholding a drug. Recently a pair of MIT 
economists argued that the one-size-fits-all approach of the FDA to the approval 
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process for drugs (from immunotherapy to flu) is a non-sense. As a result, the FDA is 
too conservative in regulating drugs for severe disease like lung cancer and too lax for 
less dire one like prostate cancer. Andrew Lo and his MIT colleagues (Montazerhodjat 
et al. 2017) focused on the statistical rationale of RCTs, and in particular on the level of 
type I error (i.e. the threshold of false positive results) that the FDA tolerate, which as 
everyone knows is fixed at 2.5%. The authors think that this threshold should instead 
vary from disease to disease, according to both its severity and its prevalence. This is 
based on the idea that patients who suffer from more serious conditions would be more 
willing to accept more uncertainty, because the alternative is often the death. While 
someone with a less severe disease such as diabetes presumably cares more about 
avoiding potential side effects, and therefore she would like to be more certain about 
the risks involved in new treatments. Thus, they perform a Bayesian decision analysis 
to estimate the threshold of type I error the FDA should accept for different drugs. 
Basically, even though they do not take into account the hazards of drugs, and they do 
not consider evidentiary standards alternative to RCTs, they supply a concrete example 
of how a risk-based classification of testing standard should be organized. For example, 
since pancreatic cancer is one of the most severe disease, they proposed a false positive 
rate for it of 28%. Although, according to their model the size of population is a positive 
modifier of the severity, and it actually increases the type I error threshold, whereas 
we would argue the opposite. 
Anyway, their analysis shows how the will to accept the uncertainty in testing 
medical treatments can be taken into account in choosing the most appropriate 
method. However, even if intuitively it might sound appealing, there is limited 
information about the levels of uncertainty that patients are willing to accept or 
tolerate, and we do not know whether and how that would differ from the one of 
regulators. With regard to this, there are some case studies, which are exclusively 
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anecdotal though. These cases are usually about drugs for untreated diseases that, once 
released, show some expected serious adverse event. The FDA therefore withdraws the 
drug from the market, and patients start to complain about that decision. For instance, 
natalizumab, a drug for multiple sclerosis, was approved in late 2004. Soon after, some 
physicians reported cases of progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy (PML), a life-
threating condition, in patients receiving the new drug, and the FDA decided to 
withdraw it despite the great uncertainty around both the incidence and the genuine 
causal link between the drug and the adverse event. However, in 2006 the drug was 
reintroduced to the market due to the pressing request of patients and family 
members. A survey of patients with multiple sclerosis (Calfee 2006) found that the 
majority would get a drug which might be more effective than the currently available 
drugs, even if it had a chance of one in a thousand of causing fatal side effects. In another 
survey of patients taking natalizumab (Miller, Karpinski, and Jezewski 2012), patients 
complained that the risks of natalizumab were overemphasized and that its potential 
benefits were overlooked. This case also shows how difficult it is to reduce the 
uncertainty about the adverse drug reactions, especially if they are rare. For instance, 
after many years, the incidence of PML for natalizumab is estimated to be >1/1000 to 
<1/100, still far to being precise. 
4.7 Conclusion 
The recent enactment of the 21st Century Cures Act is ushering a new season of heated 
debates about regulatory evidentiary standards. Most of the conservatives are worried 
by the adoption of different standards of testing for certain drugs, because of the 
potential negative impact that it would have on patients. We have shown that double 
standards are, as a matter of fact, pervasive in medicine, and that we accept them 
because we are willing to accept the consequences of potential mistakes. We have 
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focused on the case of surgical treatments, which are no regulated at all. We have 
argued that the lack of regulatory imposition is due neither to epistemic nor political 
reasons, since all of them are defeasible. Why then there is no an FDA for surgery? We 
have tried to offer an answer analyzing instead the medical devices regulation, which 
allow some devices to get market-approval almost without any proof of safety and 
efficacy (e.g. rubber gloves), while it demands more rigorous testing for other devices 
(e.g. cardiac pacemakers). We have argued that the reason for the regulators to 
consider different testing standards is political, and lies in the fact that some devices 
are intuitively safer than others and therefore it is less likely that they will produce a 
medical disaster. In an environment with limited resources, this approach sounds 
rational. 
Then we have explored the question of how to classify the risks of medical 
treatments, including drugs. With regard to this, we have suggested to adopt a 
distinction between hazards and risks in order to conceptualize the likelihood for a 
drug of producing a medical scandal. Taking in account both the hazards and the 
exposure we can have an a priori estimate of that likelihood. In this context, the size 
and the definition of target population play a key role. With the progress of biological 
science, nowadays we can circumscribe the target population for certain kind of drugs, 
such as cancer targeted therapies. In some cases, this population is composed by few 
hundreds of patients, therefore from a political standpoint potential adverse effects do 
not pose a threat to public health. 
Finally, we have considered a potential objection to our risk-based approach to 
regulatory evidentiary standards: accepting lower standard of evidence paves the way 
for more regulatory failures. However, this is hard to defend without the lack of an 
empirical benchmark. Of course, the success of this approach strictly depends on our 
ability in assessing a priori the risks of a drug. And this ability might be impaired by the 
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gaps in our knowledge, which render our estimate of risks very uncertain. And yet, 
testing all the medical treatments with RCTs is not the more rational approach to 
manage this uncertainty. Finally, we provided a concrete example of how this can be 
done, taking into account eventually also the willingness of the patient to accept 
different degrees of uncertainty. 
In conclusion, there is room for adopting more flexible testing standards in 
some cases without losing much safety for population. The higher the likelihood of a 
medical product to generate a scandal the higher the testing standards should be. As 
suggested by a recent Nature’s editorial7, regulators must collaborate closer with 
scientists in order to grasp how the new pharmaceutical treatments actually works, 
and which are the potential hazards that they carry and the patients which could 
benefit from those treatments. In this way, we could find the best regulatory balance 
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5. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE AND  
THE RELIABILITY OF MEDICAL RESEARCH  
“Everything ritualistic must be strictly avoided, because it 
immediately turns rotten” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value) 
5.1 Introduction 
Statistical evidence is pervasive in medicine. In this chapter, we will focus on the 
reliability of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) conducted to test the safety and 
efficacy of medical treatments.  RCTs are scientific experiments and, as such, we expect 
them to be replicable: assuming that the result is true, if we repeat the same experiment 
time and again, we should obtain the same outcome (Norton 2015). The statistical 
design of the test should guarantee that the observed outcome is not a random event, 
but rather a real effect of the treatments administered. However, for more than a 
decade now we have been discussing a replicability crisis across different experimental 
disciplines including medicine: the outcomes of trials published in very prestigious 
journals often disappear when the experiment is repeated - see for instance (Lehrer 
2010; Begley and Ellis 2012; Horton 2015). 
There are different accounts of the reason for this replicability crisis, ranging 
from scientific fraud to lack of institutional incentives to double-check someone else’s 
results. In this chapter we will use the replicability crisis as a thread to introduce some 
central issues in the design of scientific experiments in medicine. First, in section 1 we 
will see how replicability and statistical significance are connected: we can only make 
sense of the p-value of a trial outcome within a series of replications of the test. But in 
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order to conduct these replications properly, we need to agree on the proper design of 
the experiment we are going to repeat. In particular, we need to prevent the 
preferences of the experimenters from biasing the outcome of the experiment. If there 
is such a bias, when the experiment is replicated by a third party, the observed outcome 
will vanish. In section 2, we will argue that trialists need to agree on the debiasing 
procedures and the statistical quality controls that feature in the trial protocol, if they 
want the outcome to be replicable. In section 3 we will make two complementary 
points. On the one hand, replicability per se is not everything: we need trial outcomes 
that are not only statistically significant, but also clinically relevant. On the other hand, 
trials are not everything: the experts analyzing the evidence can improve the reliability 
of statistical evidence, although they sometimes fail; we need to study further how they 
make their decisions. In section 4 we will use a controversy about the over-prescription 
of statins to show how non-replicable effects are obtained in trials and how experts 
may fail at detecting such flaws, if the commercial interests at stake are big enough. 
5.2 What sort of statistical evidence is the p-value of a trial? 
Mathematical statistics, with different degrees of sophistication, has been used for 
different purposes in medicine since the 19th century (Matthews 1995). One major 
purpose has been the assessment of the efficacy of treatments and a significant step 
forward in our ability to assess this efficacy was the implementation of the RCT as a 
testing standard in the 1940s (Marks 1997). The RCT is an experimental design 
articulated by the statistician Ronald A. Fisher in the 1930s, endowing a comparative 
method for causal inference with statistical foundations that allowed an interpretation 
of the outcome (Armitage 2003). In its simplest form, an RCT assesses the effect of a 
treatment on a given population comparing it to a standard alternative or a placebo1. 
                                                        
1 See (Hackshaw 2009) for a quick overview. 
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The treatments are randomly allocated to the individuals in the test, usually an equal 
number in each treatment group. After the administration is complete, we measure the 
variable of interest to assess whether there is any significant difference between the 
two groups of patients.  
In order to quantify the significance of the observed difference, Fisher arranged 
the experiment as a test of the hypothesis that there is no difference between the two 
treatments (Teira 2011). This latter is known as the “null hypothesis”. Under this 
assumption, you can calculate the probability distribution of all potential outcomes of 
the experiment. In other words, a statistically significant difference is an outcome for 
which the probability, under the null hypothesis, is very low. Fisher introduced as an 
index of significance the so-called p-value, the probability of obtaining a result as 
extreme as the observed trial outcome or more if there is indeed no difference between 
treatments. A p-value of 0.05 means that, assuming that the null hypothesis is true, if 
you repeat the trial time and again, only in 5% of the repetitions will you observe such 
an extreme outcome or an even more extreme one.  
If you obtain a statistically significant result, with a p-value below the 
conventional threshold of 0.05, there are two possible ways to interpret this outcome: 
either the initial hypothesis is true (there is no difference between treatments) and you 
have observed a rare event, or, the event is actually not rare at all and the hypothesis 
is just false. There is no way to tell which is the case other than replicating the 
experiment and seeing whether further outcomes confirm or disconfirm the 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the effects of both treatments. If 
repeated trials of the experiment continue to give “unexpected” results, the therapy 
probably works and the null hypothesis is probably false. If most trials give no 
significant difference, then the trial that did so was probably just a fluke, and the null 
hypothesis is probably true. Thus, ultimately, drawing conclusions from clinical trials 
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is an inductive inference: you are trying to prove the truth of a general proposition (or 
its negation) on the basis of a finite number of instantiations. There is no surefire 
method to decide whether the hypothesis is actually true or not. As Ronald Fisher put 
it, one has a real phenomenon when one knows how to conduct an experiment that will 
rarely fail to give a statistically significant result: we can show time and again that there 
is a real difference between the effects of the tested treatments (Spanos and Mayo 
2015).  
We should notice a crucial point in this argument. The p-value estimates how 
often an outcome will appear in a series of replications of the experiment. Thus, 
Fisher’s interpretation of the trial outcome requires a frequentist understanding of 
probabilities as opposed to a Bayesian approach where probabilities measure our 
degree of belief in the truth of a given statement2. A Bayesian trial would measure how 
strong our belief in the safety and efficacy of a treatment is. In a frequentist trial we 
measure instead how often we will observe a given outcome if we repeat the same 
experiment time and again. Our p-values are tied to an experimental design. If we 
conduct a somewhat different trial of the same therapy, the probability distributions of 
outcomes will be different, and thus an outcome that was statistically surprising in the 
original experiment may not be in the new one. Thus, paradoxically, identical outcomes 
in two differently designed experiments may not confirm each other. Confidence 
intervals, alpha values and other frequentist concepts for hypothesis testing are 
equally tied to an experimental plan.  
As a general epistemic principle, scientific experiments should be replicable: if 
we implement the same design properly, we should obtain the same outcome 
independently of any subjective feature of the experimenter or the contingent 
                                                        
2 See (Nardini 2016) for a quick overview. 
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circumstances of the experimental setup. The more replicable an outcome, the more 
reliable it is. In clinical trials, as in other fields in science, p-values provide an implicit 
index of the replicability of an outcome: if we reject a hypothesis about both treatment 
effects being equal, we should expect the new treatment to perform better than the 
alternative whenever we administer it according to the trial protocol (patients, dosage, 
etc.). However, as we are will see in the next section, the p-value may be a misleading 
index of replicability.        
5.3 The sources of non-replicability  
In 1962, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) received the mandate to test the 
safety and efficacy of new treatments with “well controlled investigations,” later 
specified as two RCTs plus one further confirmatory trial (Carpenter 2010). This new 
regulatory standard created the contemporary trial industry, with pharmaceutical 
companies heavily investing in the design and conduct of RCTs in order to gain market 
access for their compounds. The FDA experts are supposed to assess these trials and 
infer whether the outcome observed in the sample of patients participating in the trials 
will obtain when the treatment is used on the general population. In other words, the 
FDA experts should assess the external validity of the trial (see La Caze 2016) that is, 
whether the causal connection established in the trial between the treatment, on the 
one hand, and improved patient outcomes, on the other, will hold in non-experimental 
clinical settings. If the drug is approved and then turns out not to be safe and efficacious 
– e.g. if unexpected adverse effects are observed once the treatment is released 
commercially – we would have accepted the wrong hypothesis in the trial: the 
experimental treatment would actually be inferior to the standard alternative.  
A correct decision should be grounded on reliable trial outcomes and in order 
to obtain these latter, the experimenters testing a drug should agree, at least, on the 
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proper controls to be implemented in the trial and on the adequate statistical design of 
the experiment. Otherwise, the p-values of their trials may be pointing to different 
experimental designs, providing non-comparable evidence. Ideally, a good trial should 
be internally valid (La Caze 2016): the experimental protocol should properly capture 
the causal connection between the administered treatment and the observed effect. A 
correct causal inference should be grounded in a like with like comparison. The 
different arms of the trial should be entirely alike except for the treatment each group 
of patients receives. Othewise, we would be unable to tell whether the observed 
difference between treatments originates in the causal effect of each treatment or in a 
non-controlled factor that creates a difference between groups. For several centuries, 
physicians have been debating the proper experimental controls that a fair test should 
implement in order to fend off confounding factors. The reader should bear in mind 
that this is an endless debate (Franklin 1990): every experimental setup is different 
and so are the potential confounding factors and the corresponding controls. 
Experimenters in all disciplines have their own checklists updated according to the 
progress in their fields. 
In medicine, researchers have paid particular attention to the biases originating 
in the preferences of either the experimenters or the experimental subjects and how to 
control for them. Non-replicable outcomes are usually blamed on these sort of biases: 
the interests of the pharmaceutical industry spoils the design of their sponsored trials, 
so that their outcome disappears once these tests are conducted in an unbiased 
manner. There are a large number of biases (Bero and Rennie 1996) so we can only 
illustrate here some that are particularly relevant for the replicability crisis. We will 




As to the former, there is a clear consensus on some of the biases that may spoil 
a trial outcome. Selection bias occurs when the allocation of subjects to study groups is 
contaminated by the preferences of the experimenter (e.g. the healthiest patients 
receive the experimental treatment). Usually it occurs when recruiters selectively 
enrol patients into the trial based on what the next treatment allocation is likely to be 
(Kahan, Rehal, and Cro 2015). Randomization controls for selection bias and is 
therefore considered a pre-requisite for a methodologically sound trial. So is the 
masking of treatments, so that the physicians and patients in the trial cannot ascertain 
what they are giving or getting, guaranteeing that their preferences do not bias the 
treatment effect. However, there is still no consensus on the full list of controls that 
should be implemented in a trial in order to consider it unbiased. 
Peter Gøtzsche (Gøtzsche 2013) illustrates the risk of unmasked trials as 
follows. In trials of antidepressant drugs, we usually assess subjective outcomes, even 
if the assessor is often a third party and not the patient himself. There is evidence from 
a meta-analysis (Hróbjartsson et al. 2014), that when the assessor is not masked to the 
treatment patients receive (i.e., she knows whether they got the experimental drug or 
a placebo), the assessor overestimates the effect on average by 36%.   
Reaching statistical significance is often a matter of getting a few more positive 
outcomes. Following Gøtzsche (Gøtzsche 2013), if you are testing an antidepressant 
versus a placebo on 400 patients, the p-value of observing 19 more patients improve 
with the experimental drug than with the control is 0.07  
 
However, if you observe two more patients improve with the active treatment 
(121 instead of 119), then your trial will reach statistical significance (p = 0.04). A non-
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masked assessment of outcomes increases thus the chances of getting a positive result. 
We may suspect that failing to mask the assessor could have been intentional if the 
sponsor of the trial was seeking such a favorable outcome. Here we see what is at stake 
with the internal validity of the trial: the design of the experiment may fail to grasp the 
causal connection (or rather, in this case, lack thereof) between the treatment and its 
study’s outcome, with the p-value providing misleading evidence about the treatment 
efficacy. 
Biases, which by their nature do not (necessarily) repeat each time a trial is 
redone, can thus be a cause of non-replicability. If we wish to eliminate bias, we need 
to agree on the list of proper controls that would guarantee an unbiased outcome and 
incorporate them into the trial protocols, in order to maximize our chances to observe 
the same outcome whenever we repeat the experiment. How far are we from these 
ideal list of debiasing controls? In principle, we should aim at controlling for every 
source of human intervention, but this is difficult to achieve. For instance, Claes-Fredrik 
Helgesson (Helgesson 2010) has illustrated practices of out-of-protocol data cleaning 
in large Swedish RCTs. Helgesson tracks the ways in which data are informally 
recorded and corrected without leaving a trace in the trial’s logbook, from post-it notes 
to guesses about the misspelling of an entry. In his view, those who make such 
corrections do so in good faith, in order to increase the credibility of their results. 
Would these corrections threaten the internal validity of the outcome? After all, if the 
experiment was replicated elsewhere, the corrections might be different and the test 
would yield a different outcome. But if we tried to explicitly control for these cleaning 
practices the experimental protocol would become extremely cumbersome. This is 
why it is so difficult to agree on a full list of controls: experimenters have different 
standards as to what constitutes an unbiased experiment and we need to reach a 
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compromise in between absolutely unbiased (but unfeasible) protocol and protocols 
that are too open to interested manipulations. 
As we noted above, the statistical analysis of trial results, as well as the study 
design itself, can lead to problems in replicability, as statististical analyses can also be 
biased, (e.g. according to the preferences of the sponsor) most notoriously when the 
sample size is not chosen according to statistically justified principles. In biomedical 
research, a particularly vocal critic of this statistical flaw is the epidemiologist John 
Ioannidis. Although some of his claims are controversial, such as “most published 
research findings are false” (see Sorić 1989; Ioannidis 2005; Ioannidis 2006; Ioannidis 
2008; Ioannidis 2014), his contributions are worth considering as a focal point in the 
replicability debate. Take for instance his empirical evaluation of very large treatment 
effects (VLE) of medical interventions (Pereira, Horwitz, and Ioannidis 2012). A 
standard complaint about industry sponsored research is that trials are designed to 
detect small treatment effects that would guarantee regulatory approval without any 
clinical innovation (e.g. “me too” drugs): in principle, VLE would sort out this problem. 
Ioannidis and his coauthors define a statistical threshold for VLE, and used data from 
the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews to identify studies that showed such 
effects and track further studies on such outstanding outcomes. They found that VLEs 
usualy arise in small trials with few events, and their results typically become smaller 
or even lose their statistical significance as additional evidence is obtained. According 
to Ioannidis (Ioannidis 2008), we have here a problem of statistical literacy: biomedical 
researchers tend to claim discoveries based exclusively on p-values, focussing on 
significance while ignoring statistical power, which is a measure of whether a study is 
large enough to detect what it is looking for. Without a proper sample size, it is 
impossible to tell a random spike in the data from a true treatment effect. If the sample 
is small, we may observe a large difference by chance, but if  the experiment were 
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repeated and the sample size grew, chance would gradually give way to the true 
treatment effect – see for instance (Button et al. 2013). Replicability fails to obtain 
because there might have been no effect to grasp – even if the trial protocol itself was 
unbiased. Although adequate sample size is usually included in lists of requirements 
for well designed studies, it is still often not met, as not all medical journals require it 
for publication. As before, part of the problem is lack of agreement as to which tools for 
bias control to require of researchers. 
Summing up, biases can contaminate the trial and spoil the statistical reliability 
of the outcome both while the experiment is being conducted and when the data are 
interpreted. The replicability of a trial will depend on which debiasing procedures and 
statistical quality controls that experimenters adopt in their experimental protocols. 
The more replicable the trial, the more reliable the information it yields.  
5.4 Is the problem truly a crisis? 
Although we have discussed some of the sources of the replicability crisis, the question 
remains whether it is reasonable to refer to the problems we have with replicability as 
a crisis. On the one hand, a trial may be replicable and yet it may not deliver the 
information we actually need: we want clinical, not just statistical reliability. 
Replicability is no guarantee of clinical benefit. On the other hand, despite the problem 
with the replicability of trials, regulators seem to have coped with them reasonably 
well until recently, according to the available data. In other words, even without 
replicability, expert judgment has allowed us to make proper decisions about the safety 
and efficacy of drugs. 
Let us argue for the first point: (Pereira, Horwitz, and Ioannidis 2012) note that 
VLE usually appear with treatments whose efficacy is defined by a laboratory test (e.g. 
hematologic response), as opposed to a clinically-defined efficacy (e.g. symptomatic 
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improvement) or a fatal outcome (e.g. death). There were only three reliably 
documented VLE that used mortality as an endpoint (out of 2791). We see here another 
contentious point in contemporary debates on biomedical research: sometimes there 
are good reasons to adopt soft endpoints (e.g. biological or imaging biomarkers) 
instead of hard trial outcomes (mortality data); sometimes not (Asmar and Hosseini 
2009). According to the industry critics, soft endpoints are chosen in order to get a 
statistically significant effect of a treatment, even if  it is clinically not very interesting. 
This positive effect is just enough for the manufacturing company to request regulatory 
approval. Such trials may be unbiased, statistically well-grouned and perfectly 
replicable, but the research question they are addressing may just concern the 
commercial interest of the manufacturer sponsoring the trial rather than the clinical 
interests of patients and physicians alike –as we will see in our case study below. This 
point suggests that some of the issues at stake in the replicability crisis go beyond the 
methodological quality of trials as scientific experiments and rather pertain to their 
clinical goals: what trial outcomes should we look for and who should decide about 
them?   
Let us argue for our second point now: expert judgment can improve the 
reliability of the information provided by trials. If trials were systematically unreliable, 
the decisions of regulatory agencies such as the FDA would be systematically 
misguided. Critics like Gøtzsche (Gøtzsche 2013), for instance, think that this is actually 
the case: 70% of FDA scientists are not confident that the drugs they approve are safe. 
If the internal or external validity of a trial fails, we will indeed observe outcomes in 
the population that were not anticipated in the trial.  
Dan Carpenter has tracked such unanticipated outcomes through label changes: 
adverse effects observed in the commercial use of a drug are often incorporated into 
its brochure. From 1980 to 2000, the average drug received five labeling revisions, 
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about one for every three years of marketing after approval (Carpenter 2010). Clearly, 
there is much about the full range of effects of a drug that we only discover after it 
reaches the market. Regulatory trials are testing the safety and efficacy of a compound, 
so these new findings do not necessarily call the original studies and their evaluation 
into question. Indeed, if we judge the reliability of trials by the number of market 
withdrawals due to serious adverse effects, the figures seem more promising: between 
1993 and 2004, only 4 out of the 211 authorized drugs (1.9%) were withdrawn 
(Carpenter, Zucker, and Avorn 2008). In other words, the external validity of trials 
might be far from perfect (they don’t track the full range of effects), but when it matters 
(serious adverse effects), the FDA seems to have been making the right decision. How 
is this possible? 
The FDA combines the statistical evidence of clinical trials with expert 
deliberation: decisions about drugs are not made on the basis of RCTs alone, but in 
committees with adversarial confrontation of experts (Urfalino 2012). These 
committees seem to be able to make correct decisions as to the safety and efficacy of 
drugs and ponder the reliability of the evidence provided by trials –for a critical 
discussion, (see Stegenga 2016). At least, under certain conditions: a 1.9% error rate 
(drug withdrawal) in a decade seems a reasonable standard. But when the FDA 
committee was given a shorter deadline, still in the same period (1993-2004), 7% of 
the drugs approved were later withdrawn (Carpenter, Zucker, and Avorn 2008). In 
other words, under certain conditions, expert judgment can improve the reliability of 
the information RCTs when it comes to making decisions about medical treatments. 
Further investigation is needed as to how these expert judgments work, but the effect 
cannot be discounted. 
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5.5 Case study: a controversy over statins 
Let us illustrate with a case study two of the previous points: not large enough trials 
and the relevance of expert judgment. The treatment under discussion will be statins, 
a class of drugs that inhibits the cholesterol synthesis associated with cardiovascular 
diseases (CVD). Statins have been widely used over the last thirty years to prevent CVD, 
with excellent success in many different trials – and an equally successful record in 
sales. However, there is a growing concern that statins are being overprescribed on the 
basis of trials that verify their ability to decrease cholesterol in many groups of patients 
without evaluating whether they prevent these patients’ death – (see Goldacre 2014; 
González-Moreno, Saborido, and Teira 2015). The reader should bear in mind that this 
is a controversial issue and the question is far from settled.   
This concern about overpresciption was highlighted by the controversy that 
followed the publication, in November 2013, of The American College of 
Cardiology/American Heart Association guidelines on the topic. These new guidelines 
recommend the use of statins for primary prevention of CVD (prevention of CVD in 
patients who do not yet have it) in patients with a 10-year predicted risk of CVD of 
7.5% or greater; statin therapy was suggested as an option in patients with a predicted 
risk between 5% and 7.4%. These are very low thresholds and, consequently, more 
than 45 million (about one in every three) middle-aged asymptomatic Americans 
qualified for treatment with statins. If we consider that the US population is about one-
twentieth of the global population in the same age-range, and assuming that the 
distribution of risk profiles is similar, this would suggest that approximately one billion 
people should take statins. In Ioannidis’s words, this would amount to a “statinization” 
of the planet (Ioannidis 2014) 
Taking statins is not completely harmless: there are side effects, such as myalgia 
that paradoxically prevents exercise training, which on its own can results in health 
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gains and decreased CVD (Macedo et al. 2014). So, what were the grounds for such a 
massive public health intervention? According to Ioannidis (Ioannidis 2014), the 
guidelines were based on trials that tracked the cholesterol reduction in patients, but 
did not follow them for long enough to see whether such reductions lowered also their 
mortality rate. This was the case of JUPITER, one of the biggest trials testing a statin in 
patients who had not yet shown evidence of CVD (primary prevention) (Mora and 
Ridker 2006). It showed that the treatment significantly reduced the risk of myocardial 
infarction, stroke and vascular events, but, because it showed strong evidence of 
benefit early, the trial stopped following patients after 1.9 years instead of the planned 
4 years, and thus was unable to detect an effect on mortality in the participants (De 
Lorgeril et al. 2010). 
Trials are statistically designed to reveal a treatment effect of a given size with 
a minimal error rate. We need a certain amount of data (a designated number of 
patients: the sample size) to minimize error. If we interrupt the trial, we are losing data 
and we can only be certain of identifying the true effect of a treatment under a number 
of statistical assumptions. JUPITER was interrupted because the preventive effect of 
statins was judged big enough to make the remaining two years of data accumulation 
unnecessary. In other words, the implication was that if someone were to try to 
replicate JUPITER in full, she would observe the same effect, as the effect JUPITER 
observed was so large, even before it was completed, that it could not reasonably be 
supposed to be due to chance. 
But, in fact, when other researchers tried to reproduce the same effect, they 
were unsuccessful. For instance, CORONA trial (Kjekshus et al. 2007) aimed to test the 
efficacy of statins in secondary prevention, treating patients who already have had a 
cardiac event, with a view to reducing the probability of a second one. The conclusion 
was that “there were no significant differences between the two groups in the coronary 
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outcome or death from cardiovascular cause.” This was an unexpected outcome, since 
the trial population should clearly benefit from the preventive effects of statins. Indeed, 
the physio-pathological mechanism of stroke or myocardial infarction is always the 
same, statins should be at least as efficacious in the secondary prevention as in the 
primary and we have not any scientific reason to think the opposite. In fact, the only 
difference between the two populations is the probability of observing an infarction, 
which is obviously higher in patients who already had one than in healthy people. This 
has an important consequence in designing and performing trials. As we have just 
mentioned in primary prevention, if the population is at lower risk, this means that the 
probability of observing a myocardial event is low; therefore, the detection of the 
outcomes needs both a bigger sample size and a longer follow-up of patients. Whereas 
in secondary prevention, we need less people and a shorter follow-up to show an effect 
of statins since the probability of observing a cardiac event is high. Therefore, from a 
statistical point of view, it should be easier to demonstrate the efficacy of statins in 
secondary prevention than in primary, yet this did not happen. The negative results of 
CORONA were also reached by two more trials: GISSI-HF (GISSI-HF investigators, 
2008) and AURORA (Fellström et al. 2009). In patients undergoing hemodialysis with 
high cardiovascular risk, rosuvastatin lowered the LDL cholesterol level but had no 
significant effect on a hard composite end point (death, myocardial infarction, and 
stroke). CORONA, GISSI-HF and AURORA appear to be trying to reproduce the effect 
observed in JUPITER in conditions where it should be even easier to detect. Why did 
these replications fail? Perhaps because the decision to interrupt JUPITER for evidence 
of early benefit was mistaken. (Although it was not exceptional. A systematic review 
showed that the number of trials that are being stopped early for apparent benefit is 
gradually increasing (Bassler et al. 2010). It often happens that the decision to stop is 
not well justified in the ensuing reports (see Nardini 2013): the treatment effects are 
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often too large to be plausible, given the number of events recorded. Thus, the observed 
effects are not replicable because researchers ground their conclusions too 
optimistically on not large enough sample sizes (insufficient power).  
Unlike the FDA experts discussed in the previous section, The American College 
of Cardiology/American Heart Association did not correct for the flaws in JUPITER and 
we may suspect that they may have been somehow biased by the huge commercial 
interests at stake. Hence, we need to pay attention not just to the replicability of trials, 
but also to the way in which experts judge their conclusions. 
5.6 Conclusion 
We have only covered (partially) the methodological side of the replicability crisis. We 
have shown how a proper epistemic interpretation of p-values requires replicability. 
This latter depends, on the one hand, on the controls we impose on the experiment to 
secure that it is not biased by any particular preference or skill of the experimenter (or 
any other participant in the trial), and, on the other hand, on a proper statistical design 
for the trial, in which the sample size plays a crucial role. Without a previous agreement 
on the list of controls and statistical features that characterizes a fair trial, we may be 
missing replicability due to ambiguity in our experimental plan. And yet, not only 
statistical replicability matters. As John Norton has recently argued (Norton 2015), the 
epistemic value of a replication is domain-specific: it depends on what we already knew 
about a given condition and the goals we seek to reach with a treatment. On the one 
hand, we need clinically (and not just statistically) significant outcomes. On the other, 
we need to investigate how experts’ judgment can properly assess the statistical 
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This thesis has been organized around two overlapping questions: (1) whether 
and how the current approach to the regulation of new medicines should be modified 
to manage issues generated by new biomedical products, and (2) whether this issue 
may be reduced to an epistemological and methodological analyses. With regard to 
this, let us summarize what we have achieved so far. 
At first, we have explored the history of the current regulatory system in order 
to understand why regulators adopted RCTs as the gold standard for testing drugs 
before granting market approval. When the drug trade emerged at the beginning of the 
20th century, quality controls of drugs manufacturing were adopted as the sole 
standard for drug regulation. In the following years though, a series of pharmaceutical 
catastrophes made clear that neither laboratory test nor experts’ judgment provided 
enough evidence to protect consumers from serious adverse effects. In the same years, 
innovations in the design of experiments and statistics emerged in agricultural 
sciences, and gave the opportunity to the medical community to conceive and conduct 
methodologically sound comparative experiments to test treatments. Despite some 
early successful applications of the new experimental design (RCTs) in the context of 
medical testing, FDA had not neither the political nor scientific authority to set new 
standards until another tragedy occurred in 1962. The notorious thalidomide scandal 
forced regulators to revise their previous decisions, and to finally implement RCTs as 
the gold standard for drug testing. This brief historical analysis clearly shows that 




Secondly, we have highlighted some practical challenges that nowadays are 
hindering the conduct of RCTs to test new cancer treatments in the light of the post-
genomics revolution. To overcome those difficulties, novel experimental designs are 
under investigation, adaptive trials being the most promising. However, regulatory 
agencies have not fully endorsed them yet mainly for two reasons: they are afraid that 
a lack of standardization could actually transform the decision-making approval into a 
never-ending process, and there is not a clear scientific consensus on the foundations 
of novel trial designs. With this regard, we proposed a way to avoid a regulatory 
impasse while dispensing with a strict regulatory standard, and to facilitate scientific 
agreement. In a casuistic regulatory framework, experts should agree not on theories 
behind the features of every single trial design, but only on single real cases, which is 
far easier. Once regulators have found an agreement on a small set of paradigmatic 
cases, they can indeed easily assess new ones by analogical reasoning. With regard to 
this, we suggested as a potential paradigmatic case the clinical development of 
crizotinib, a molecularly targeted drug for the treatment of lung cancer recently 
approved on the basis of two small single-arm early phase trials. 
In third place, we explored the consequences of a more flexible regulatory 
system adopting the distinction between rules versus standards as a theoretical 
framework to capture the costs at stake in the current controversies on regulatory 
evidence. There are, indeed, good a priori arguments about the superiority of standards 
of evidence (i.e. evidential pluralism) in the detection of drugs safety and efficacy. And 
there are equally good a priori proposals on how to organize impartial committees to 
carry out such deliberation. However, framing the decision in terms of the costs of 
implementing these ideals allows us to grasp also the actual trade-off that regulatory 
authorities should make: there is only a limited amount of resources for them to use. It 
is possible that the current system based on RCTs have offered so far, a cost-effective 
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way of protecting patients, if their safety is defined in terms of market withdrawals. In 
any case, our regulatory experience provides an empirical benchmark for other 
alternatives. We suggest that, rather than further a priori discussions, we need instead 
to test these alternatives in a pilot committee.  
Fourthly, we have focused on the debate ushered by the recent enactment of the 
21st Century Cures Act, which has paved the way for a more flexible drug regulation. 
Most of its critics are worried by the potential negative impact that it would have on 
patients. We argued that the multiplicity of testing standards is more defensible than 
critics think, showing that it is already pervasive in medicine, and that we accept it 
because we are willing to accept the consequences of potential mistakes. We have 
argued that the reason for the regulators to consider different testing standards is 
neither epistemic nor methodological but rather political, and lies in the fact that some 
medical products are intuitively safer than others and therefore it is less likely that they 
will produce a medical disaster. In an environment with limited resources, this 
approach sounds rational. With regard to this, we have suggested to adopt a distinction 
between hazards and risks in order to better understand the risk regulators care about. 
This latter can be defined as the likelihood of a treatment of producing a medical 
catastrophe. In this context, the size and the definition of target population play a key 
role. With the progress of biological sciences, nowadays we can circumscribe the target 
population for certain kind of drugs, such as cancer targeted therapies. In some cases, 
this population is composed by few hundreds of patients, therefore from a political 
standpoint targeted therapy do not pose a threat to public health.  
In the final chapter, we have covered partially the methodological side of the 
replicability crisis in the context of clinical trials. We have shown how a proper 
epistemic interpretation of p-values requires replicability. This latter depends, on the 
one hand, on the controls we impose on the experiment to secure that it is not biased 
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by any particular preference or skill of the experimenter (or any other participant in 
the trial), and, on the other hand, on a proper statistical design for the trial, in which 
the sample size plays a crucial role. Without a previous agreement on the list of controls 
and statistical features that characterizes a fair trial, we may be missing replicability 
due to ambiguity in our experimental plan. And yet, not only statistical replicability 
matters. On the one hand, we need clinically significant outcomes (and not just 
statistically). On the other hand, we need to investigate how experts’ judgment can 
properly assess the statistical evidence provided by trials. Of course, the reliability of 
evidence is crucial for making sound regulatory decisions, and our analysis shows once 
again that it does not depend exclusively on the source with originate it, but also on a 
consensus between experts, which might transcend epistemological considerations. 
Coming back to our central questions (1) and (2) we can draw some general 
conclusions. First of all, there is no way to tackle the issue of changing drugs regulation 
exclusively from an epistemological perspective. Epistemological and methodological 
considerations are important, but nonetheless the financial and political issues at stake 
in drug regulation are enormous. Thus, any epistemological analysis taken out of 
context cannot make any addition to current debates. Secondly, we must be aware that 
scientific landscape is rapidly and constantly changing. The molecular revolution in 
biomedicine makes urgent and crucial to reconsider a regulatory system that has been 
put in place to regulate products which were essentially different. We should as well 
take very seriously the fears of the potential negative consequences of adopting looser 
regulatory standards of evidence, especially because so far RCTs have offered a 
reasonable level of safety to patients. The good news, in our view, is that there is room 
for changes without losing much safety for population. The bad news is that changes 
for the better would require a more systematic and collective effort, which might be 
beyond any political and academic willingness. 
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The work collected in this thesis should be understood as aimed at paving the 
way to the possibility of developing a more rational and coherent philosophy of drug 
regulation. All of the arguments in this thesis therefore add to the growing body of work 
in the philosophy of medicine, and how it can be applied to the evaluation of medical 
treatments and technologies 
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